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I. History 
The Latin phrase culpa in contrahendo literally means 'fault in the conclusion of 1 
__ . __ "...,~ ..... The termwas coined in the medieval glossa ordinaria on the Justinianic Corpus iuris 
1 but the honour of its invention is mainly attributed to the German scholar Rudolf von 
who was the first to apply the wording to situations of pre-contractual liability. 2 He 
that the parties to a contract were under a duty to negotiate according to good faith. 
the 19ch century, the phrase has been used within civillaw jurisdictions to cover a variety 
· ons arising in the pre-contractual phase, essentially involving failure to disclose reasons 
voidness or illegality of a contract to the other party. Due to the reluctance of the com-
law to recognize a general principle of good faith, 3 the use of the term in European private 
restricted to the special case of breaking-off negotiations against good faith and fair deal-
, •. , ... ,..r,,x,, Art 2:301, [1]). 
nrnhiP:m of good faith and fair dealing in Roman law. Despite the Latin wording, the 2 
of culpa in contrahendo was unfamiliar to ancient Roman law. The absence of pre-
~-."''~ ............. liability derived from the fact that Roman jurists did not reason about the forma-
of contracts. That is to say, the starring point for legal reasoning, at least in consensual 
, was not the declaration of intention of each party, but the agreement between the 
(consensus). 4 1hus, where the will of one or both parties 'was lacking the necessary direc-
the contract was void without further questioning the origin of the party's mistake. 5 In the 
sale, however, the seller was liable for express declarations or promises about the object 
et promissa);6 for fraudulent concealment of defects in the object; and for express warran-
stipulation.l Besides, since the time of Hadrian, the Roman jurists allowed the buyer to 
a daim on the contract of sale (actio empti) if the vendor had (positively) known about 
or lack of title. 8 This extension of contractualliability resulted from the application 
criterion of good faith inherent to the contract of sale.9 Tortious liability was not available 
cases due to the restrictions of the claim for property damage: damnum iniuria datum 
Iex Aquilia10 did not cover pure economic lass, while the tortious claim for deliberate 
14.3.1 ... sed et plus possunt conveniri, si fuerint in culpa in contrahendo, si modo sint solvendo, on which 
Römisches Privatrecht: Rechtsdenken und gesellschaftliche Verankerung: Eine Einführung (1999) 213 f, 
further explanations see T Giaro, 'Culpa in contrahendo: Eine Geschichte der Wiederentdeckungen', in 
H Mohnhaupt (eds), Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und seine Richter: Zur Reaktion der Rechtsprechung auf die 
des deutschen Privatrechts (2000) 113-54, 114-18; HKK/Harke, § 311 II, III, [5)-[7). The last comprehen-
is Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 5-17. 
G Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences', 
11-32. 
MJ Schermaier, 'Auslegung und Konsensbestimmung: Sachmängelhaftung, Irrtum und anfängliche 
nach römischem Kaufrecht', (1998) 115 ZSS (RA) 235-88,248,279 f. 
an overview on error see Zimmermann, Obligations, 587-96; for remedies against dolus, metus, and fraud, 
for these promises derived from the Aedilician edict, on which see E Jakab, Praedicere und cavere beim 
Sachmängel im griechischen und römischen Recht (1997). 
all these see F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951) 925. 
main text is D 19.1.30 .1.1. This further development is attributed to the jurist Salvius Julian, see MJ Schermai er, 
in Roman contract law', in Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good faith, 85 f. 
the role of good faith (bona fides) in Roman law see Schermaier (fn 8) in Whittaker and Zimmermann, Good 
especially 67 f. 
the lex Aquilia see the survey in Zimmermann, Obligations, 953-1017. 
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deceit (actio de dolo malo) only allowed recovery of pure economic loss where there had been 
intentional harm. 11 
3 Medieval extensions of liability. The medieval commentators on the Justinianic compilation 
widened the scope of the Iex Aquilia and established a general tortious liability for fault (culpa) 
that allowed compensation for any harm, including pure economic loss. 12 This development 
provided the basis for liability within the pre-contractual stage. The tendency to allow tortious 
liability for negotiations conducted in bad faith was intensified in legal humanism, whose 
scholars tried to strengthen the purchaser's protection by establishing liability for the presumed 
fault of the vendor. 13 1he usus modernus pandectarum unified these approaches, and the Natural 
Law doctrine (Grotius) was the first to apply tortious liability (ex lege Aquilia) if the contract of 
sale was invalid because of an error of the buyer which had been negligently induced by the 
vendor. 14 More generally, Jean Domat and Robert Joseph Pothier held the contracting parties 
liable if a contract was void for a cause that was due to the imprudence of one party. 15 However, 
the 19ch_century German historical school of jurisprudence led by Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
argued for a more restrictive scope of tortious liability. Its adherents challenged the medieval 
and modern extension of the Lex Aquilia by going back to a specific Iist of proteered rights and 
interests, such as property, life, liberty, and health. The motivation behind this restrictive view 
was not only a concern for historical authenticity, ie renewing 'classical Roman law', but an 
argument of legal policy. The protagonists of the historical school stated that the broad applica-
tion of a general tortious liability would lead to an increase in daims and hinder economic 
development (Verkehrsschutz). 16 This claim even led to a restrictive interpretation of existing 
statutes ( the most important of which was the ALR) that envisaged liability of parties wirhin 
the pre-contractual phase. 17 
4 Jhering's invention. The pandectists' resistance against pre-contractualliability can inter alia 
be explained by their new approach to the formation of contract. Contract was indeed analysed 
by Friedrich Carl von Savigny as the coincidence of two separate dedarations of intention 
(Willemerklärung). 18 Thisnewunderstandingofcontractledtoacontroversyaboutthepredominance 
of either the will or the declaration. Since von Savigny argued for the will, this approach led to 
an increasing number of void contracts, whenever the will was vitiared by a (unilateral) error. 
Jhering's (1861) main concern 19 was to compensate the party who had relied on the void con-
tract for the loss incurred.20 According to the pandectists' doctrine, in this case, contractual 
liability did not arise without the requisite valid contract, while tortious liability was unavailable 
for pure economic loss. Moreover, the general action for fraud (actio de dolo) was only available 
11 See R Jhering, 'Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfeetion gelangten 
Verträgen', (1861) 4 Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts 1-112, 24 f. 
12 For the medieval development see N Jansen, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts (2003) 272-88; on the usus moder-
nus legis Aquiliae see Zimmermann, Obligations, 1017-31; on the development under Naturallaw see id, Obligations, 
1032-40. 
13 See Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 57-87. 
14 On the humanists and Naturallaw schools see Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 90-149 and 120-39. 
15 On Jean Domat and Robert Joseph Pothiersee Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 139-49. 
16 Zimmermann, Obligations, 1037 f with further references. 
17 See PrALR I 5 § 284, on which see N Jansen, 'Developing legal doctrine: Fault in the German law of delict', in 
id (ed), The Development and Making of Legal Doctrine (2010) 96-125, 100-3. 
18 On this functional explanation of Jhering's theory see Kessler and Fine, 'Culpa in contrahendo ', 402. 
19 Jhering (fn 11); on Jhering in English see: F Procchi, 'Roman Contracrs and the Construction of Fault in Their 
Formation', in AJ McGinn (ed), Obligations in Roman Law: Past, present and foture (2012) 76-101. 
20 Jhering (fn 11) 2. 
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if the party had acted with intent, but not if the mistake was due to negligence of the mistaken 
party. 21 For Jhering, the absence of any legal protection of the party who had relied on the valid-
ity of the contract was contrary to equity and good faith. As a remedy, he established liability 
for negligent conduct during negotiations, especially in situations where the negligent party 
could avoid the contract because of an error. This liabilitywas based on Fragments from the Digest 
dealingwith the liability incurred by the vendor of a sacred object (res sacra).22 Although the sale 
of a res sacra is void, these texts grant a contractual claim (on the sale), or a factual action simi-
lar to sale (actio in Jactum), if the buyer was unaware of the special character of the object. 
Jhering inferred the rule that all contracting parties are bound to avoid negligent or culpable 
conduct during the process of contracting. 23 
Faggella. Jhering's invention24 was widely discussed and spread to other civil law countries. 5 
Important amendments were made by the Italian judge Gabriele Faggella (1906) and by the 
French scholar Raymond Saleilles (1907). Faggella distinguished three different pre-contractual 
periods (periodiprecontrattuali). 25 He reconsidered the process of the Formation of the contract 
via offer and acceptance, establishing a general pre-contractual period of legal relevance. 26 This 
led to an extension of the liability, since Faggella held that a party could be found liable due to 
a sudden termination of the pre-contractual phase, even before the (formal) issue of the offer. 27 
The basis of this liability was the (general) Consensustobe contracting parties, which Faggella 
qualified as 'pre-contractual' consensus,28 meaning that the pardes agreed tobe in a contracting 
state of mind. For Faggella, the basis of this liability was therefore parallel to contractualliabil-
ity, which meant that it was founded on good faith. 
Saleilles. Another new aspect was introduced into this discussion by Raymond Saleilles, who 6 
integrated Jhering's findings into the structure of the French Civil code and dealt with it as 
tortious liability. For the French scholar, the fact that the parties had entered negotiations cre-
ated a situation of mutual dependence. 29 His main argument was that the negotiation of a 
contract wastobe seen as a juridical fact ifait juridique), ie an event that was likely to produce 
legal effects, but not a juridical act (acte juridique), ie an intentional declaration of the parties 
with a view to creating legal effects.30 Thus, on the one hand, the parties were free to end the 
negotiations, but, on the other hand, a failure to respect the juridical fact could incur liability. 
Like Faggella, Saleilles dealt mainly with breaking-off negotiations against good faith. While 
he stressed the right of the parties to retreat from negotiations at any time, he claimed that, 
exceptionally, their retreat might be regarded as a tortious wrong, if it could be assimilated to 
21 For a cornprehensive analysis see P Larnbrini, Studi sull'azione de dolo (2013) 121-36. 
22 See D 18.1.62.1; Ulp D 11.7.8.1. 
23 Jhering (fn 11) 3. The author referred to H Richelrnann, Der Einfluß des lrrthums aufVerträge: Ein civilistischer 
(1837) 129 f. 
24 For a recent overview on the reactions see I Fargnoli, ' "Culpa in contrahendo" e azioni contrattuali', in L Garofalo, 
in rem' e actio in personam: in ricordo di Mario Talamanca', vol II (2011) 437-80, 444-52. 
25 G Faggella, 'Dei periodi precontrattuali e della loro vera ed esatta costruzione scientifica', in L Pierro (ed), Studi 
· in onore di Carlo Fadda pel..XXV anno del suo insegnamento, vol III (1906) 269-342. 
26 Faggella (fn 25) 297-301. 
27 Faggella (fn 25) 302 f. 
28 
Faggella (fn 25) 302-4; seealso R Saleilles, 'De la responsabilite precontractuelle-a propos d'une etude nou-
sur la rnatiere', (1907) 3 Revue trimestrielle de droit civi/697-754, 702 f. 
Saleilles (fn 28) 741. 
1he theory of acte juridique is derived frorn the German Rechtsgeschäfts/ehre, see Ranieri, Obligationenrecht, 
-51. 
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an abuse of rights. 31 Therefore, according to Saleilles, the party who is breaking off negotiations 
will be held liable if the circumstances of the retreat qualify his behaviour as contrary to 
good faith. 32 In cantrast to Faggella, Saleilles accepted liability only in cases where there had 
already been an offer. On this view, pre-contractualliability was a counterpart to the con-
temporaneous French law that allowed the revocation of the offer until the moment of 
acceptance. 33 
II. Comparative observations 
1. Scope of protection 
7 Reliance interest and expectation interest. Jhering's aforementioned study on culpa in contra-
hendo (above, [ 4]) was also ground-breaking as regards the measurement of compensation. 
Jhering observed that, in the Roman sources, the buyer of an inheritance was granred com-
pensation on the basis of the expectation interest if the inheritance did not belang to the 
vendor. However, the buyer was only entitled to the reliance interest if the inheritance 
simply did not exist. 34 Jhering therefore distinguished the positive interest from the negative 
interest:35 while the positive interest covered the benefits that would have accrued to the 
purchaser had the contract been valid, the negative interest looked to the situation the pur-
chaser would have been in if the contract had not been concluded. 36 This difference was 
further explained by Fuller and Perdue37 who distinguished three principal purposes which 
may be pursued in awarding contract damages: 'First, the plaintiff has in reliance on the 
promise of the defendant conferred some value on the defendant.' This is called 'the restitu-
tion interest'. 'Secondly, the plaintiffhas in reliance on the promise of the defendant changed 
his position', the 'reliance interest'. 'Thirdly, ... we may seek to give the promisee the value 
of the expectancy which the promise created', ie the 'expectation interest'. 38 In accordance 
with Jhering, they stressed that the reliance interest might be 'a compromise between no 
enforcement and complete but too onerous enforcement of the promise' and that American 
case law showed that the reliance interest was used as 'a kind of midway station between no 
contract and a "complete" contract'. 39 
8 Convergences between civil law and common law. The analysis of the common law by 
Fuller and Perdue (above, [7]) coincides with the tendency of most civillaw jurisdictions 
that accept pre-contractualliability, to grant only the reliance interest in case of negotiations 
in bad faith. Dutch law seems to have been a notable exception. In Plas v Va/burg, 40 the 
Hoge Raad ruled that 'it is not impossible that negotiations concerning a contract may 
31 Saleilles (fn 28) 742. 
32 On the distinction of fault and abuse of rights A Tenenbaum, 'Terminology', in Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud, 
European Contract Law, 190-4. 
33 Saleilles (fn 28) 743-51. 
34 D 18.4.8; Paulus D 18.4.9. 
35 Jhering (fn 11) 10. 
36 Jhering (fn 11) 16 f. 
37 LL Fuller and WR Perdue, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages' (1936) 46 Yale Lf 52-96. 
38 Fuller and Perdue (fn 37) 53. 
39 Fuller and Perdue (fn 37) 86. 
40 Plas v Valburg, HR, (1983) N]723 (18.06.1982) (annotated by CJH Brunner); see JM van Dunne, 'Netherlands', 
in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 223-37, 230 f. 
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such an advanced stage that the act of breaking off must in itself be regarded, in the 
..... n-v<'L,·L ... • ng circumstances, as a breach of good faith, on the basis that the parties may be 
..••• ....-.&>•rt mutually to have relied on the expectation that some sort of contract would in any 
t result from the negotiations.'41 This decision has been interpreted as meaning that, if 
party breaks off negotiations at a stage where the parties believed that the contract would 
concluded, the liability may even amount to the expectation interest. 42 More recent case 
in the Netherlands, however, seems to show a tendency to restriet pre-contractualliabil-
in all cases to the reliance interest. 43 
or contract? From the very beginning, there has been an important difference amongst 9 
law countries in the foundation of pre-contractualliability. Jhering's argument implied 
it was based on contractualliability, since the Roman jurists had granted the contractual 
in such situations, despite the voidness of the contract (above, [2]). Due to the limi-
of tortious liability in 19rh_century German doctrine, liability was founded on the 
:nrrunjen(x: or the appearance of a contract. 44 This foundation was in cantrast to the medieval 
that had applied tortious liability,45 a tradition that had been codified in Art 1382 
civi/ 1804 (=Art 1240 Code civi/).46 Already in 1883, the Court of Appeal in Parisheld that 
fallacious promise to consent to a contract can, without obliging the promisor contractu-
constitute a fault in tort' .47 Even if there had been a discussion in French law as to whether 
faith could be an autonomaus foundation of the liability (Art 1134 Code civi/ 1804),48 the 
doctrine and the French courts finally stuck to tort law. 49 The function of this pre-
'"~.a. .......... """' liability is to counter-balance the right freely to withdraw an offer (revocabilite de 
, and the consequences of the theory of annulment for vices des consentement. 50 In fact, 
defendant will be held liable if his negligence has caused the other to believe in the forma-
or in the validity of a contract that ultimately does not come into existence. 51 Both diver-
traditions, ie the dassifications as either contractual or tortious liability, comprise the 
~"' . .., .......... tradition, which explains the nuanced solution of European Union law: Art 12 of 
'HR 18 June 1982 Plas v Valburg', in Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, 
(NL)]. On the Dutch model see also V an Erp, 'Pre-contractual Stage', 506 f. 
'HR 18 June 1982' (fn 41) in Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.21 
CBB v ]PO Projecten, HR, (2005) N] 467 (12.08.2005), on which see C Bollen, 'Enforcement of the duty to 
on negotiations: (Should it be) a possibility in Europe or not?', in J Smits, D Haas, and G Hesen, Specific 
in Contract Law: Nationaland Other Perspectives (2008) 231-51, 233. 
Jhering (fn 11) 28 f, 33 fand 36 f with reference to Ulp D 19.1.13.3; also Jhering (fn 11) 41, 43 and 88 f. 
Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 364 f; Deroussin, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 220 f. 
Deroussin, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 189-222, 212 f. Usually, French academic doctrine takes the decision 
Cour de cassation in 1972 as starring point, see 0 Deshayes, 'Le dommage precontractuel', (2004) Revue 
de droit commercial et economique, 187-204, 187 fn 2; Y-M Serinet, 'Le contrat-le consentement', in 
G Loiseau, and Y-M Serinet, Traite de droit civil: La formation du contrat, vol I ( 4'h edn, 2013) 530-4, 
CA Paris, 13 February 1883, Gaz Pal1883, II, 414; see J Schmidt, 'La sanction de la faute precontractuelle', 
72 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil46-73, 51 for further references. 
Deroussin, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 215 fand 220 f; see also the Art 1104 Code civil. 
See Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 371-5 on Saleilles' role. On 'faute' see A Bürge, Das französische Privatrecht 
fahrhundert (2"d edn, 1995) 402-10; J-L Halperin, 'French doctrinal writing', in N Jansen, 1he Development and 
of Legal Doctrine, vol VI (2010) 96-125, 73-95, 75 f. 
R Nirk, 'Rechtsvergleichendes zur culpa in contrahendo', (1953) 18 RabelsZ 310-55, 325; Procchi, Licet emptio 
366-9. 
Procchi, Licet emptio non teneat, 369. For decisions see Cass com, 00-10243; 00-10949, Bull civ IV 2003, 
(26.11.2003) 206, on which see Ghestin, Loiseau, and Serinet (fn 46) 546-55 [757]-[769]. 
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the Rome II Regulation applies the law of the country that would apply to the contract,52 
while the conditions of the claim are ruled by tort law. 53 
2. Case law in different jurisdictions 
10 German-speaking countries. Important differences can be observed in the application of 
pre-contractualliability in different civillaw countries. The most extensive scope is achieved 
in the German-speaking countries, which use the term of culpa in contrahendo even beyond 
Jhering's intentions for any harm that may occur during the pre-contractual phase.54 This 
covers protection for each other's physical integrity, personal property, and duties of disclosure.55 
The main causes of this resort to contract law are deficiencies in the law of torts: the German 
law of torts covers only injuries to absolute (property) rights and has weaknesses with regard 
to liability for third parties and pure economic loss. 56 Still significant is the leading 'Iinoleum 
carpet case' (Linoleumrollenfal~ decided by the Reichsgericht in 1911.57 The female claimant, 
accompanied by her child, had gone to a warehause in order to choose a rug of Iinoleum. 
When the employee of the shop lifted two rolls of Iinoleum, another roll feil and hurt both 
the woman and the child. Although the incident prevented the claimant from buying the 
carpet, the Reichsgericht applied contractualliability to the woman's situation, since the par-
ties were in a situation of contractual negotiation. Indeed, if the court had applied tort law, 
the owner of the shop could have avoided liability for the negligence of the employee by 
proving that he hirnself had carefully selected and supervised the employee (§ 831 BGB). It 
was only under contractualliability that the employer could be held liable for any fault or 
negligence of the employee (§ 278 BGB). 58 From this decision onwards, Germancourts and 
doctrine have assumed that negotiating pardes are in a relationship similar to a contractual 
one. If they fail to respect the other party's legitimate expectations and interests, contractual 
liability will apply.59 1his general obligation includes liability for the 'creation of the expectation 
that a contract will come into existence', 60 but the bulk of case law relates to pre-contractual 
52 N Hage-Chahine, 'Culpa in Contrahendo in European Private International Law: Another Look at Article 12 
of the Rome II Regulation', (2012) 32 Northwestern]ournal oflnternational Law & Business45l-540, 461 f. The leading 
case is ECJ, 17.09.2002-C-334/00, Fonderie Offteine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA!Heinrich -wtlgner Sinto Maschinenfabrik 
GmbH (HWS), 2002 ECR, I-7357, I-7396. 
53 This distinction stems from the French tradition, see J Ghestin, 'La responsabilite contractuelle pour rupture 
des pourparlers', in J-S Borghetti, 0 Deshayes, and C Peres (eds), Etudes ojfertes a Genevieve Viney (2008) 455-65 and 
id, 'La responsabilite delictuelle pour rupture abusive des pourparlers', (2007) La Semaine ]uridique edition generale, 
155, 15-21. 
54 Giaro (fn 2) 137-9. Similarly, for Austria, see W Posch, 'Austria', in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 43-52, 48 f. 
For Switzerland see BGE 39 II 227 (26.04.1913); 41 II 95, 101 E.2 (11.02.1915); 49 II 54, 67 E.4 (27.02.1923); 51 II 
49, 54 (28.01.1925). 
55 Kessler and Fine, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 404 f; critically D Medicus, 'Zur Entdeckungsgeschichte der culpa in 
contrahendo', in Iuris proftssio: Festgabe for Max Kaser (1986) 169-81; Lehmann, Die Zukunft der cic', 693-715. 
56 See S Leible, 'Culpa in contrahendo', in 0 Remien (ed), Schuldrechtsmodernisierung und Europäisches 
Vertragsrecht: Zwischenbilanz und Perspektiven-Würzburger Tagung vom 27. und 28.10.2006 (2008) 219-43, 220 f; 
Lehmann, 'Die Zukunft der cic', 694 f. 
57 RGZ 78, 239-41, on which see Markesinis, Unberath, and Johnston, German Contract Law, 95 fand Giaro 
(fn 2) 135 f. 
58 On the differences between § 278 BGB and § 831 BGB see Markesinis, Unberath, and Johnston, German 
Contract Law, 95. 
59 Details on the development in doctrine and courts untill939 in Giaro (fn 2) 142-9. 
60 RG 19 January 1934, RGZ 143, 219, on which see Kessler and Fine, 'Culpa in contrahendo ', 404. Doubting 
Markesinis, Unberath, and Johnston, German Contract Law, 96. 
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duties with regard to property and personal rights of the other party. Despite its specific 
background in German tort law, this approach has been followed by Austrian61 and Swiss 
I . 62 lega pracnce. 
1he French view. In legal systems that are influenced by French law,63 culpa in contrahendo has 11 
a narrower scope than in the German-speaking countries. It covers the breaking off of negotiations 
in bad faith, which constitutes an abuse of the freedom of contract and a 'fault' in the sense of 
Art 1382 Code civifl 804 •64 Since 1972 the Cour de cassation has broadened this liability by 
inferring that an abuse can also be seen in a negligent act of the withdrawing party, eg if one 
party breaks off negotiations that have advanced so far that the other party could believe in the 
formation of a contract, without any legitimate motivation (motif legitime) 65 or with 'blame-
worthy thoughtlessness' (legerete bldmable).66 
1he common law resistance. In centrast to most civil law countries, the common law is 12 
opposed to a generalized concept of culpa in contrahendo. This is due to 'the aleatory view of the 
negotiations' and the 'concept of negotiating at arm's length', both of which exclude a duty to 
negotiate in good faith. 67 Besides, it has been argued that the duty to negotiate in good faith was 
too uncertain to be enforced. 68 In Walford v Miles Ltd, 69 the House of Lords held that it could 
hot be up to the court to decide subjectively whether a proper reason for ending negotiations 
ex:isted or not.7° Since the common law does not acknowledge the existence of a special relation-
during the pre-contractual phase, the legal remedies for situations covered by culpa in 
rnntr'al11'?ntto in civillaw countries are mainly outside the contractual sphere in the common law. 
some cases of failed negotiations, an action may be based on unjust enrichment,71 which 
the recovery of the loss of one party who has conferred a benefit to the other. 72 Another 
61 Leading cases are OGH 1 Ob 617/79 (30.05.1979), SZ 52/90 = Justizblatt 1980, 33 =Der Gesellschafter 1979, 
3 Ob 502/80 (28.01.1981); 1 Ob 3/83 (23.02.1983); 3 Ob 504/83 (13.04.1983); 8 Ob 581/87 (25.06.1987); 4 Ob 
1 (28.05.1991); 4 Ob 571/95 (24.10.1995); 4 Ob 2292/96d (17.09.1996); 8 ObA 176/00s (13.07.2000); 2 Ob 
b (21.12.2006); 3 Ob 7/07m (31.01.2007). 
BGE 39 II 227 (26.04.1913); 41 II 95, 101 E.2 (11.02.1915); 49 II 54, 67 E.4 (27.02.1923); 51 II 49, 54 
See also Art 197 and 198 of the Greek Civil Code, on which see G Arnokouros, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and 
Precontractual Liability, 37 -42; similar also Art 1337 Codice civile, on which see A Musy, 'Case 1', in 
and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 44-6. 
For Portugalsee L Menezes Leitäo, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 51 f; for Spain 
Hernanz, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 53 f. 
For an overview see de Coninck, 'Le droit commun', 22 f. 
Cass com, 91-18842, Bull civ IV 1994, No 79 (22.02.1994). 
Kessler and Fine, 'Culpa in comrahendo ', 407, 409 speak of two opposing paradigms; Farnsworth, 
ont.ract:ual Liability', 221; Lehmann, 'Die Zukunft der cic', 696; best overview in J .Cartwright, Contract Law: An 
f. 
n to the English Law ofContract for the Civil Lawyer (2nd edn, 2013) 71-90. 
Kessler and Fine, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 412 f (with an overview of the exceptions to the principle of cer-
Giliker, Pre-contractual Liability, 8-16. Courtney and Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Bros (Hotels) Ltd [1975) 1 WLR 
301. 
Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, on which see Banakas, 'Liability', 8-13; V an Erp, 'Pre-contractual Stage', 
See Banakas, 'Liability', 8 f; Giliker, Pre-contractual Liability, 32-6. For 'best endeavours' see Little v Courage 
70 P & CR 469, 475 ([1995] CLC 164); on which see Banakas, 'Liability', 11 f. Iondon and Regionalinvestments 
TB! plc, Belfast International Airport Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 355, [38-40). 
For a general principle see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548; in this context see Banakas, 
' 15 f; J Cartwright, 'Case 4', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 119 f. 
r an example see 'Case 9', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 254-74. Markesinis, 
and Johnston, German Contract Law, 102 referring to British Steel Corporation v C/eveland Bridge Engineering 
[1984] 1 All ER 504. 
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resort may be tortious liability, but until now, the courts have refused to apply the general torr 
of negligence. 73 This implies that the party who has incurred Iosses during negotiations may 
only get compensation on the ground of the tort of deceit, meaning that the daimant has to 
prove that the defendant made a false Statement about his intentions to conclude the contract 
and that the claimant incurred losses because he relied on it.74 Moreover, in recent years, there 
has been scholarly debate about broadening the role of promissory estoppel from 'a shield'75 to 
'a sword', but until now (in English law) promissory estoppel is only able to suspend rights, not 
to create new ones.76 
III. Culpa in contrahendo in statutes and other legal texts 
13 National legislation on culpa in contrahendo. As previously mentioned (above, [4]-[7]) 
culpa in contrahendo was a discovery of 19th-century legal doctrine mainly developed and 
shaped by jurisprudence. Legislation on the topic has, until recently, been relatively scarce, 
and covered only special applications of the principle. For example, the German BGB prom-
ulgated on 1 January 1900 contained some provisions that could be explained by Jhering's 
concept of pre-contractualliability. 77 The most visible influence, nowadays abolished, could 
be found in § 307 BGB, that provided for the (strict) liability of a party who had known 
about the reasons for the initial voidness of the contract.78 A general norm of pre-contractual 
liability has been introduced in Italy in 1942. Apart from Art 1338 Codice civile, which obliges 
the party who knew about the invalidity of the contract to compensate the other party's darn-
age incurred in reliance on the validity of the contract/9 Art 1337 Codice civile states that 'the 
parties in the course of negotiations and in the formation of the contract must conduct 
themselves according to good faith'. 80 Since 2001, the most extensive provision can be found 
in the (modernized) BGB, where two special provisions attempt to codify the jurispruden .. 
tial developments. 81 The situations covered by the new § 311 (2) BGB rank from a formal 
73 See Cartwright (fn 67) 176 f. 
74 For England see J Cartwright, 'Case I', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 24 f; for 
Ireland see R Friel, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 42-4; for Scotland see 
M Hogg and H MacQueen, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 52 f: 'fraudulent 
misrepresentation'. 
75 E Cooke, The Modern Law ofEstoppel (2000) 119. 
76 Peel, Treitel, [3-086]-[3-088]. Bur see Waltons Stores {Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 for the 
Australian position. 
77 The relevant provisions are § 122 BGB, § 179 (2) BGB, and § 307 BGB1900, on all these see Medicus (fn 55) 
175-8; in English: Markesinis, Unberath, and Johnston, German Contract Law, 94 f. 
78 See also Jhering (fn 11) 2; Kessler and Fine, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 403. On Jhering's influence on ltalian law 
see Fargnoli (fn 24) 453 (on Art 1338); Giaro (fn 2) 126-30 (for scholarship), 130-4 (for the courts). 
79 Art 1338 Conoscenza delle cause d'invalidica: 'La parte ehe, conoscendo o dovendo conoscere I' esistenza di una 
causa d'invalidica. del contratto (1418 e seguenti), non ne ha dato notizia all'altra parte e renuta a risarcire il danno da 
questa risentito per avere confidato, senza sua colpa, nella validita del contratto (1308).' 
80 
'Le parti, nello svolgimento delle trattative e nella formazione del contratto, devono comporrarsi secondo buona 
fede (1366,1375,2208)', on which see G Alpa, 'Iraly', in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 197-204, 197; A Musy, 
'Case 1', Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 44-6. 
81 § 311 (2) BGB referring to 'Obligations created by legal transaction and obligations similar to legal transactions' 
states that 'an obligationwich duties under § 241 (2) also comes into existence by pt the commencement of contract 
negotiations, 2nd the initiation of a contract where one party, with regard to a potential contractual relationship, gives 
the other party the possibility of affecting his rights, legal interests and other interests, or entrusts these to him, or 3rd 
similar business contacts' (official translation available online). 
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beginning of negotiations (I) to an informal initiation of negotiations (2) and even any simi-
lar contact between business relations. 82 This definition of the pre-contractual obligations 
berween pardes in negotiations suffices to create liability under reference to § 280 (I) BGB. 
However, even if culpa in contrahendo is now recognized by a German codification, the main 
task is still jurisprudential: given the general application of the code, the courts will need to 
define and confine the application of the principle. 83 1he same observation applies to the new 
French law (Art 1112 Code civil) on the topic. 84 
Cross-border contracts: absence of the culpa in contrahendo within the CISG. Because of 
the scepticism of most common law countries, it has not been self-evident that an obligation 
to negotiate according to good faith and fair dealing would be included in international and 
transnationallaw texts. Indeed, the CISG did not contain rules on culpa in contrahendo, as, 
during the proceedings, the Anglo-American countdes opposed an attempt by the (former) 
German Democrarie Republic to include a duty to negotiate in good faith. 85 This is why 
CISG 7 (1) simply states, that 'in the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to ... the observance of good faith in international trade.' Despite doctrinal views to the 
contrary, 86 the history of the Convention clearly indicates that the CISG does not indude 
culpa in contrahendo. This view is corroborated by the argument that the objective liability 
within the CISG is opposed to the principle of fault that characterizes the institution of culpa 
in contrahendo. 87 
Applkation of nationallaw in international sales? The application of nationallaw to the ques- 15 
tion of culpa in contrahendo in international sales contracts governed by the CISGis problem-
atic. The issue of pre-contractualliability for breaking off negotiations can be regarded as falling 
within the scope of the Convention. In fact, CISG 16 (2) provides that: 'an offer cannot be 
revoked: (a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is 
irrevocable; or (b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and 
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.'88 1his nuanced position with regard to the binding 
of the offer constitutes a compromise between the different national legal traditions. 
nPr.Pt-n,rP, as a commentator has put it, 'the difficult compromise in CISG 16 would be jeopard-
if, by threatening damages claims under national law, it were possible to pressure the 
32 Leible (fn 56) 225. 
83 On the application of the new law see U Babusiaux, 'Die gesetzliche Rechtfertigung des richterlichen 
· in P Jung (ed), Europäisches Privatrecht in Vielfalt geeint: Richterliche Eingriffe in den Vertrag (2013), 
114 Art 1112 Code civil states: Tinitiative, le deroulement et Ia rupture des negociations precontractuelles sont libres. 
doivent imperativement sarisfaire aux exigences de la bonne foi. En cas de faute commise dans les negodations, la 
du prejudice qui en resulte ne peut avoir pour objet de compenser la perte des avantages attendus du centrat 
conclu.' 
A good overview on the to and fro is given by AH K.ritzer, Pre-Contract Formation (2008) available online; see 
DM Goderre, 'International Negotiations Gone Sour: Precontractual Liability under the United Nations Sales 
· ', (1997) 66 University of Chicago LR 258-81. A nuanced view in H Fleischer, Informationsasymmetrie im 
(2001) 969-74. 
MJ Bonell, 'Vertragsverhandlungen und culpa in contrahendo nach Wiener Kaufrechtsübereinkommen', (1990) 
der internationalen Wirtschaft, 693-702, 700 f; Goderre (fn 85) 280. 
I Schwenzer, 'Aufwendungsersatz bei nicht durchgeführten Verträgen', in Festschrift für Peter Schiechtriern (2003) 
663 f. 
On this argument see Schiechtriern and Schwenzer/Schroeter, Intro to Art 14--15, [56]; Art 16, [13]. 
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offereror into maintaining in force an offer that was revocable under the CISG.'89 As a result, all 
pre-contractualliability is excluded. This creates a lacuna where the parties to a cross-border 
contract break off negotiations in bad faith, which is objectionable.90 It seems that this unre-
solved problern of the CISG triggered the introduction of liability for breaking off negotiations 
in bad faith in the first edition of the PICC in 1994.91 This international text can be seen as the 
starting point for the European contract law of culpa in contrahendo. 
89 Schiechtriern and Schwenzer/Schroeter, Art 16, [13]. 
90 Goderre (fn 85) 280 f; opposite view in Magnus, 'Remarks on Good Faith: The United Nations Convention on 
Contracrs for the International Sale of Goods and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 
Principles ofinternational Commercial Conrracts', (1998) 10 Pace International LR 89-95. 
91 They can be used to complete the CISG, see Schiechtriern and Schwenzer/Hachem, Art 19, [17] with further 
references. On the general problern of the treatment of PICC wirhin the scope of the CISG: Schiechtriern and 
Schwenzer/Schmidt-Kessel, Art 9, [26]; R Michaels, 'Umdenken für die UNIDROIT-Prinzipien: Vom Rechtswahlstatut 
zum Allgemeinen Teil des transnationalen Vertragsrechts', (2009) 73 RabelsZ 866-88. 
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Art 2:301: Negotiations Contrary to Good Faith 
A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement. 
However, a party who has negotiated or broken off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair 
dea.ling is liable for the Iosses caused to the other party. 
is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue nego-
ns with no real intention of reaching an agreement with the other party. 
ACQP 2: 10 1: Good faith 
In pre-contractual dealings, parties must 
act in accordance with good faith. 
ACQP 2: 102: Legitimare expectations 
In pre-contractual dealings, a business 
must act with the special skill and care 
that may reasonably be expected to be 
used with regard, in particular, to the 
legit:imate expectations of consumers. 
ACQP 2:103: Negotiations contrary to 
good faith 
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not 
liable for failing to reach an agreement. 
(2) However, a party who has conducted 
or discontinued negotiations contrary to 
good faith is liable for loss caused to the 
other party. 
(3) In parricular, a party acts contrary to 
good faith if it emers into or continues 
negotiations with no real intention of 
reaching an agreement. 
PCC 2: 101: Duty to Negotiate in 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(1) Parries are free to initiate, continue 
and break off pre-contractual negoti-
ations, provided they act in accordance 
with the requirements of good faith 
and fair dealing. The failure of pre-
contractual negotiations can only give 
rise to liability if it is the consequence 
of a fault or actions contrary to good 
faith and fair dealing of eieher party. 
(2) A party who emers into or pursues 
pre-contractual negotiations wichout the 
intention of conduding a contract does 
not respect the requirements to negotiate 
in accordance with good faith and fair 
dealing. 
(3) A party who breaks off pre-
contractual negotiations for no legitimate 
reason, while the other party could 
legitimately believe that a contract 
would be concluded, acts contrary to 
the requirements of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
(= PCC 2:101): Dutyto Negotiate in Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
DCFR 11.-3:3012 
(1) A person is free to negotiate 
and is not liable for failure to 
reach an agreement. 
(2) A person who is engaged 
in negotiations has a duty to 
negotiate in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing and 
not to break off negotiations 
contrary to good faith and fair 
dealing. This duty may not be 
excluded or limited by con-
tract. 
(3) A person who is in breach 
of the duty is liable for any loss 
caused to the other party by 
the breach. 
( 4) It is contrary to good 
faith and fair dealing, in par-
ticular, for a person to enter 
into or continue negotiations 
with no real intention of 
reaching an agreement with 
the other party. 
are free to initiate, continue and break off pre-contractual negotiations, provided they act in 
with the requirements of good faith and fair dealing. The failure of pre-contractual 
!Pt1attor1s can only give rise to liability if it is the consequence of a fault or actions contrary to 
faith and fair dealing of either party. 
who enters into or pursues pre-contractual negotiations without the intention of concly~~i:. 
contract does not respect the requirements to negotiate in accordance with good faith and fair 
who breaks off pre-contractual negotiations for no legitimate reason, while the other party 
legitimately believe that a contract would be concluded, acts contrary to the requirements of 
faith and fair dealing. 
has stayed unchanged between the first and the second edition. 
wording in FS 27. 
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I. Defining culpa in contrahendo 
II. European authorities 
III. The legal basis of culpa in contrahendo 
IV. The behaviour giving rise to liability 
1. The principle: breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and 
fair dealing 
2. Particular applications of the principle 
3. The legal consequences: reliance interest 
I. Defining culpa in contrahendo 
[1]-[2] 
(3]-[7] 
[8]-[9] 
[10]-[27] 
[10]-[15] 
[16]-[21] 
[22]-[27] 
1 Introduction. The relevant textuallayers are the PICC, the PECL, the ACQP, the DCFR, and 
the original text of the PCC. These texts prove that in European private law there is a common 
understanding of culpa in contrahendo, as meaning the breaking off of negotiations contrary to 
good faith and fair dealing. Such liability was first established in the PICC, which then influ-
enced the PECL, the PCC, the ACQP, and the DCFR. All these texts start from the principle 
of freedom of contract and declare that the parties are free to break off negotiations. The ACQP 
vary from the other texts insofar as they particularly deal with consumer contracts, and take the 
view that in consumer contracts the principle of good faith must be realized by proteering the 
legitimate expectations of the consumers (ACQP 2:102). The CESL did not provide for a rule 
on the issue-apparently because it only applies where the negotiations between the parties have 
culminated in an agreement. Nevertheless, the instrument thereby evokes the misleading 
impression that the only duties that are relevant for the conclusion of the contract are the trad-
ers' duties of information. As for DCFR II.-3:301 and FS 27, the provision adds in paragraph 
2 that the duty to negotiate in good faith and fair dealing is mandatory. But, as shown by 
PICC 1.7, this mandatory character is not a special feature of pre-contractualliability, but of the 
general duty to act in good faith. 3 Therefore, it seems tobe more appropriate to leave this aspect 
out of the text on culpa in contrahendo. 
2 The PCC as most appropriate norm. Most of the texts cited-apart from the PI CC-state a 
duty to negotiate in good faith and according to fair dealing. They all agree that breaking off 
negotiations against these two principles leads to liability for the loss incurred by the other 
party. They also agree that particular examples of conduct against good faith are starring or 
continuing negotiations with no real intention to reach an agreement. While the liability in the 
PICC, PECL, and the texts following their example (the ACQP and the DCFR) only deals 
with this kind of fraudulent and intentional abuse of the right to interrupt negotiations, the 
PCC also explicitly mention the negligent breaking-off of negotiations. Starting from the 
assumption that breaking off negotiations can only give rise to liability if it is due to 'fault or 
actions contrary to good faith and fair dealing' (PCC 2:101 (1)), 4 the PCC state that 'a party 
who breaks off pre-contractual negotiations for no legitimate reason, while the other party 
could legitimately believe that a contract would be conduded, acts contrary to the requirements 
of good faith and fair dealing' (PCC 2:101 (3)). Therefore liability may also be incurred if the 
3 On the mandatory character of good faith see vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.5, [46] f. 
4 On the PCC see B Fauvarque-Cosson and D Mazeaud, Principes contractuels communs (2008) 267 f; the wording 
of the PICC is rightly criticized by vogenauer!Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [25]. 
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defendant, who negotiated in good faith and with the intention of reaching a contract, finally 
broke off negotiations for insufficient reasons and/ or against the legitimate expectations of the 
other party. It is this behaviour that can be qualified as 'fault' in the sense of the provision mean-
ing nothing else than an objective contravention against the rules of good faith and fair dealing 
(for further details see below, [18, 19, 20, 21]). 5 1he commentaries on the other texts agree that 
these cases are covered by culpa in contrahendo, although they are not explicitly mentioned by 
the texts.6 Since the PCC explicitly deal with this important application of the principle/ their 
English textwill be the basis for the following commentary. 
II. European authorities 
1he PICC as a first step. After the German Democrarie Republic's unsuccessful attempt to 3 
integrate a duty to negotiate in good faith into the CISG, the PICC were the first text to state 
such a duty on the international Ievel and for commercial contracts. This turning-point can be 
explained by a nurober of factors. First, it may have been of relevance that the PICC-in cantrast 
to the CISG-are only model rules, not a binding convention; therefore the scepticism of most 
common law countries, which had argued against the principle within the travaux preparatoires 
on the CISG, did not prevail. 8 But it must be added that, since the CISG, good faith had 
become an established criterion in different common law countries.9 On the one hand, an 
tion to prevent 'speculation with offers' had been recognized as against good faith by the 
:>elCOnla American Restaterneut on Contract Law. 10 On the other hand, the implementation of 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracrs Directive had introduced the civil law criterion of 
faith into the English legal system. 11 
good faith criterion within the PICC. Nevertheless, it is evident that this first step towards 4 
general duty to negotiate in good faith and according to fair dealing was taken with circum-
. n. 12 PICC 2.1.15, indeed, does not explicitly provide for a duty to negotiate in good 
but lays down that 'a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable 
' Contrary to the German tradition, fault in French and in European private law does not imply a moral reproach; 
W-T Schneider, Abschied vom Vi!rschuldensprinzip (2007). 
For the PICC see Comment 3 to Art 2.1.14, p 16; seealso Vogenauer/Zuluoaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [31]-[37]; for 
PECL see Commentary A. 
The French original of PCC 2:301 reads: 'Negociations contraires a la bonne foi. (1) Les parties sont libres de 
et ne peuvent encourir de responsabilite pour ne pas etre parvenues a un accord. (2) Toutefois, la partie qui 
ou rompt des negociations contrairement aux exigences de la bonne foi est responsable du prejudice qu' eile 
a l' autre partie. (3) Il est contraire aux exigences de bonne foi, notamment, pour une partie d' entamer ou de 
des negociations sans avoir de veritable intention de parvenir a un accord avec 1' autre'. The English transla-
Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud, European Contract Law, 575. 
WJgenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [20], who shows that-again, just as for the CISG-the German Democrarie 
was involved in the process. 
'10genauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [1] with further reference speaks of the 'global trend towards an increasing role 
Standard of good faith in contract law'. 
On the American background see JM Perillo, 'Unidroit principles of International Commercial Contracts: The 
Ietter Text and a Review', (1994) 63 Fordham LR 281-344, 287 f. This can also be true under English common 
a recent application on 'relational' contracts see Ytzm Seng Pte v International Trade Corp [2013] EWHC 111; 
Groundschool Limited v Intelligent Data Capture Limited [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch); JD&G Cars Ltd v Essex Police 
[2015] EWHC 226 (QB). On Commercial Contracrssee also S Leible, 'Culpa in contrahendo', in 0 Remien 
C:I1Utart~chtsmc,,de?·nisierztn(}' und Europäisches Vi!rtragsrecht: Zwischenbilanz und Perspektiven-Würzburger Tagung 
und 28.10.2006 (2008) 219-43, 231. 
For details on the directive in Englandsee Beatson, Burrows, and Cartwright, Anson, 186-233. 
Van Erp, 'Culpa in contrahendo', 74. 
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for the lasses caused to the other party' .13 As the official comment on the PICC indicates, this 
negative formulation ('in bad faith') is tobe interpreted as an application ofPICC 1.7 on good 
faith and fair dealing. Therefore PICC 2.1.15 must be seen as equivalent to a positive formula 
('against good faith and fair dealing') and all attempts to diminish the significance of the PICC 
for pre-contractualliability are wide off the mark. 14 
5 Additions and variations in phrasing between PECL, PCC, and DCFR. The PECL, like the 
Gandolfi Project, 15 published shortly after the PICC in 1995 and 1998 respectively, employed a 
positive formulation, and were the first to state that contracting parties are under a duty to act 
in accordance with the requirements of good faith and fair dealing. 16 The inversion from bad 
faith to good faith has been supported since the PECL by the addition of the synonym 'fair 
dealing'. The last term was added in order to stress that good faith is to be understood in the 
sense of a standard, not as a moral category, 17 and does not mean a change in the legal basis of 
the liability. 18 Indeed accumulations of synonyms for a general principle have a long historical 
tradition and can also be observed in nationallaws. 19 A final and important textual variation is 
due to the PCC in 2008. All other texts that follow the PICC 2.1.15 (3) state that it is 'contrary 
to good faith and fair dealing' viz 'bad faith', 'in particular, for a party to enter into or continue 
negotiations when intending not to reach an agreement with the other party' (PECL 2:301 (3), 
DCFR II.-3:301 (4)). However, the PCC add that 'a partywho breaks off pre-contractual nego-
tiations for no Iegitimate reason, while the other party could legitimately believe that a contract 
would be concluded, acts contrary to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing' (PCC 
2:101 (3)). With this amendment the scope of the culpa in contrahendo in European law is 
clearly defined. It covers not only negotiations in bad faith, where the party pretends to be in a 
contracting state of mind, but also breaking off negotiations against good faith and fair dealing. 
Thus, it protects the other party's reliance if this is legitimate with regard to the principle of 
freedom of contract. 
6 Pre-contractual duties in consumer contracts and culpa in contrahendo: ACQP 2: 10 1-ACQP 
2:103. European Union law has profoundly changed the pre-contractual phase by creating 
13 In PCC 2:101, the duty to negotiate in good faith has been completed by a reference to fair dealing and two 
examples of negotiations in bad faith have been added. 
14 S Vogenauer and J Kleinheisterkamp, Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (2009), [2] and [6] rightly criticized by vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [21]: 'Despite the adoption of 
this language [ie 'bad faith'], the drafters continued to recognize that this article made it clear that the principle of good 
faith extended to the pre-contractual phase.' 
15 Gandolfi, Avant-projet, Art 6. Obligation of good faith '1. Each of the parties is free to undertake negotiations 
with a view to concluding a contract wichout being held at all responsible if said contract is not drawn up, unless his 
behaviour is contrary to good faith. 2. To enter into or continue negotiations with no real intention of conduding a 
contract is contrary to good faith. 3. If in the course of negotiations the parties have already considered the essendals 
of the contract whose condusion is predictable, either party who breaks off negotiations without justifiable grounds, 
having created reasonable confidence in the other, is acting contrary to good faith. 4. If the Situations considered in the 
above paragraphs occur, the party who acted contrary to good faith shall be liable for the harm he has caused to the 
other party to ehe extent of the costs the latter had to incur while the contract was being negotiated. Loss of 
apportunides caused by the negotiations underway shall also be made good.' 
16 The PICC aretobe understood in this sense, see Wlgenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [23]. 
17 vogenauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [18] f. 
18 See E Navarretta, 'Faith and Reasonableness in European Contract Law', inJ Rutgers and P Sirena (eds), Ruks 
and principles in European contract law (2015) 135-50. 
19 The aspect has been stressed by vogenauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [19]. On the different layers of good faith see 
G Wicker, 'Guiding Principles of European Contract law', in Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud, European Contract 
Law, 423-38, 515-31; B Fages, 'Pre-contractual Duties in the Draft Common Frame of Reference-What Relevance 
for the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts?', (2008) 3 ERCL 304-16, 313. 
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extensive duties of information and by establishing a right of withdrawal for the consumer. 20 
Although it has been stated that the principles for consumer contracts are to be distinguished 
from general contract law, 21 the rules of liability for culpa in contrahendo might be altered if 
consumers are involved. Indeed if-as ACQP 2:102 states-'a business must act with the special 
skill and care that may reasonably be expected to be used with regard, in particular, to the 
legitimate expectations of the consumer', this can be interpreted in the sense that a professional 
bas to respect a special standard of good faith when negotiating a contract with a consumer. 
This higher standard of protection could Iead to a stricter liability for breaking off negotiations, 
at the cost of the professional, whenever the consumer had reasons to rely on the formation of 
the contract. One could, for example, argue that a professional facing a consumer may not 
withdraw from the negotiations because he discovers during negotiations that his supply is run-
ning out. On the contrary, due to the consumer's right to withdraw from the contract, there can 
be no protection of the professional's reliance during negotiations. Indeed, if the consumer is 
allowed to withdraw not only from an offer, but from a contract, there is no place for pre-
contractualliability for breaking off negotiations from the side of the consumer. 22 
No need for culpa in contrahendo in consumer contracts. Both examples cited above ([6]) 7 
must be judged to be of merely theoretical interest, since consumer contracts normally do not 
involve the lang period of negotiation and preparation of the contract which is said to be typical 
for commercial contracts and the reason for culpa in contrahendo. 23 Indeed, the overlaps between 
consumers and professionals that might have existed in some member states, eg France, 24 have 
been reduced by the Consumer Rights Directive in 2011.25 Therefore, liability for culpa in con-
trahendo does not play a role in consumer contracts and its application can be limited to classical 
contract law, especially among autonomaus commercial agents. 
III. The legal basis of culpa in contrahendo 
Policy arguments. Arguments and counter-arguments for pre-contractualliability have been 8 
exchanged between national and comparative law. The traditional argument against pre-
fOOtractualliability is its uncertain basis: since the outcome of negotiations cannot be known 
'in advance, pre-contractualliability for breaking off negotiations seems to contradict the prin-
of freedom of contract (above, Intro before Art 2:301, [12]). On the other hand, supporters 
ef the culpa in contrahendo normally invoke the need to protect the victim of blameworthy 
.~wnaiUCt, even at the stage of pre-contractual negotiations (above, Intro before Art 2:301, [ 4] 
[8]). In recent years, economic analysis oflaw has strengthened the position of the supporters, 
R Schulze, 'Precontractual Duties and Conclusion of Contract in European Law', (2005) 6 ERPL 841-66, 
21 Schulze (fn 20) 848. 
On the scope of the protection of astatute with regard to culpa in contrahendo see J Hager, 'Die culpa in contra-
in den UNIDROIT-Prinzipien und den Prinzipien des Europäischen Vertragsrechts aus der Sicht des deutschen 
~l:lfgeJrlicl1en Rechts', in J Basedow (ed), Europäische Vertragsrechtsvereinheitlichung und deutsches Recht (2000) 67-84, 
23 PICC, Comment 2 to Art 2.1.1, p 35; PICC, Comment 3 to Art 2.1.15, p 61; on the negotiation process seealso 
Farnsworth, 'Negotiations of Contracrs and Precontractual Liability: General Report', in W Stoffel and P Volken 
Confiits et Harmonisation Melangesen l'honneur d'Alfred E. von Overbeck (1990) 657-80, 657 f. 
For an overview see Terre, Simler, and Lequette, Obligations, [74-1]. 
See Art 2 of the Consumer Rights Directive. This demarcation between consumer and professional was devel-
in ECJ, 20.01.2005-C464/01,]ohann Gruber/Bay wttAG. 
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since culpa in contrahendo might be an efficient means of preventing opportunistic behaviour by 
parties who break off negotiations without a legitimate motive.26 On this view, culpa in contra-
hendo favours freedom of contract insofar as opportunism may Iead to 'under-investment' from 
the parties during pre-contractual negotiations, which may itself have the effect of less efficient 
contractual arrangements. 27 Having said that, any expansion of pre-contractualliability would 
Iead to a corresponding loss of contractual freedom, since the parties would be prevented from 
breaking off negotiations that have exposed insuperable differences or that have proven to be 
inefficient. 
9 Systemic trust as argument for culpa in contrahendo. A similar approach can be found in 
legal sociology, where Nildas Luhmann has developed the idea of systemic trust 
(Systemvertrauen). 28 Transferred to culpa in contrahendo, this means that pre-contractualliabil-
ity is not only relevant for the protection of individual parties, but also contributes to general 
trust in the functioning of the legal system, especially contract law.29 In legal terms, the need 
to balance freedom of contract and loyalty is best expressed in French law:30 while freedom of 
contract is seen as the very basis of pre-contractual negotiations, the principle of loyalty is said 
to be 'a safeguard' (garde-fou) against the risk of unconscionable behaviour or rupture of nego-
tiations.31 Equally, in European private law, the Iimitation of freedom of contract via 
pre-contractualliability is justified by the general principle of good faith and fair dealing, 32 
that is to say, by the protection of the other party's faith in and reliance on the conclusion of 
the contract. 
IY. The behaviour giving rise to liabüity 
1. The principle: breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing 
10 The negotiation process. Since the scope of culpa in contrahendo in European private law 
covers liability for breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing, it is 
necessary to define the scope covered by the term 'negotiations'. The term 'negotiations' 
focuses on the gradual process of contract formation. It does not exclude an analysis of the 
final contract in offer and acceptance terms, but puts the emphasis on the parties' preparations 
for the future contract. Via 'negotiations,' it is possible to consider the parties' behaviour even 
before any issue of an offer, or a formalization of the results reached so far in a preliminary 
26 EC Melato, 'Precontractual liability', in G de Geest, Contract Law and Economics (2nd edn, 2011) 9-30, 23, 
referring to JP Kostritsky, 'Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for 
Precontractual Negotiations', (1993) 44 Hastings LR 621-705; JP Kostritsky, 'Uncertainty, Reliance, Precontractual 
Negotiations and the Hold-up Problem', (2008) 61 SMU LR 1377-439. 
27 See H Fleischer, Informationsasymmetrie im Vertragsrecht (2001) 419 with further reference; RG Shell, 
'Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Towards a New Cause of Action', (1991) 44 
Vanderbilt LR 221-82. 
28 N Luhmann, Vertrauen-ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität (Yd edn, 1989) 50-7; in English 
see N Luhmann, 'Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problemsand alternatives', in D Gambetta (ed), Trust: Making and 
breaking cooperative relations (1988) 94-107. For an application to Roman law see D Nörr, Aspekte des römischen 
Völkerrechts: Die Bronzetafel von Alcantara (1989) 145-54. 
29 Fleischer (fn 27), 422 f. 
30 J Ghestin, G Loiseau, and Y-M Serinet, Traite de droit civil: La formation du contrat, vol I (4ch edn, 2013) 
513-15, [709-11]. 
31 See Ghestin, Loiseau, and Serinet (fn 30) 514, [711]. 
32 This generative function of good faith for different legal doctrines has been stressed also by Zimmermann and 
Whittal{er, Goodfoith, 676 (dring also culpa in contrahendo); seealso Van Erp, 'Pre-contractual Stage', 502. 
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".:. __ .. .,..,.lrn,.., t (below, [12]). Although all European textuallayers and nationallegal systems in 
Europe still use the offer and acceptance model of contract formation, 33 it is widely accepted 
there might be contracts34 that cannot be analysed via this model. Moreover, the offer 
acceptance model does not exclude a phase of negotiations. In fact, there might be cases 
which, after a period of negotiations, one party makes a proposal with the characteristics 
an offer (above, Intro before Art 2:301, [6]), which is then accepted by the other party. 
an 'offer' has a specific juridical content, 'negotiations' are more a matter of fact. As a 
ne, it can be said that the period of negotiations has begun when the parties are in 
and start to exchange relevant information with the potential for making a later con-
The end of negotiations is either the conclusion of a contract; a withdrawal from nego-
by all the parties; or a unilateral break-off by one party. 35 Liability for culpa in 
..... 1-'! .. /lnPruln may apply to this last alternative. If the party who is breaking off did not follow 
standard of good faith and fair dealing, he will be liable for infringement of the mutual 
that is at stake in negotiations for a contract. 36 
:-eliJllllltlafY agreements: contractual liability. A special situation for culpa in contrahendo 11 
if the parties have reached preliminary agreements before one party breaks off the nego-
37 'Preliminary agreement' refers to any agreement 'made during negotiations in antici-
of some later agreement that will be the culmination of the negotiations'. 38 In practice, 
agreements might have different names39 and different scopes depending on the parties' 
wr~emlents. For example, the parties may intend to fix some issues on which an agreement 
already been reached;40 to keep third parties out of the negotiation process;41 or to assure 
continuation of the negotiations. In the common law, there has been a debate about the 
!.1·""··"'-':uJJ..u.ty of 'agreements to negotiate'42 or 'to negotiate in good faith'43 or 'to use best 
to form a contract. 44 Since European private law acknowledges the duty to negotiate 
'""""""·rf·"""'""' with good faith and fair dealing even without any prior agreement of the parties, 
uted agreements must in principle be enforceable. If the parties' intention to be bound 
See Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, TaUon, and Vogenauer, Contract Law [6.1]-[6.4]; Farnsworth (fn 23) 
See PECL 2:211 ( Contraces not Concluded through Offer and Acceptance), which only provide that ehe rules 
to contracts concluded via offer and acceptance) 'apply wich appropriate adaptations even though the 
of condusion of a contract cannot be analysed into offer and acceptance'; DCFR II.-4:211. 
On these guidelines see Wlgenauer/Zuluoga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [17]. 
Coninck, 'Le droit commun', 55 fand 60. 
A general analysis in Farnsworth, 'Precontractual Liability', 217-94; see also A Schwartz and RE Scott, 
lltnJLCtual Liability and Preliminary Agreements', (2007) 120 Harvard LR 662-707. 
'Precontractual Liability', 249 f. 
'Precomractual Liability', 250 names 'Ietter of intent', 'commitment Ietter', 'agreement in princi-
~mc>rartdum of understanding', or 'heads of agreement'; J Schmidt-Szalewski, 'La periode precontractuelle en 
, (1990) 42 Revue Internationale de Droit Compare 545-66, 560 cites 'le pacte de preference', 'les contrats 
(punctuation), and 'les contrats temporaires'. 
'Precontractual Liability', 250 speaks of an agreement with open terms. 
lock-out agreements (for England) see J Cartwright, 'Case 4', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual 
119f. 
English law see Walford v Mi/es [1992] 2 AC 128. On which see Banakas, 'Liability', 8-13; Van Erp, 'Pre-
Stage', 504 f; for American law see Farnsworth, 'Precontractual Liability', 251 and 264 wich reference to 
Wharton (1857) 6 HLC 238, 304 f (10 ER 1287, 1313) (Lord Wensleydale). 
-- .. .., • .,, .. 'Precomractual Liability', 256. 
v Courage [1995] 70 P & CR 469, 475 ([1995] CLC 164); on which see Banakas, 'Liability', 11 f. Iondon 
Investments Ltd v TB! plc, Be/fast International Airport Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 355, [38-40]; Cable & 
IBM UK[2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm); Petromec lnc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrohras [2005] EWCA Civ 
Ltd v BlackpoolAirport Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 417. 
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can be proven, the nature of the liability incurred is-irrespective of the quality of the liability 
incurred for culpa in cantrahendo-of a contractual nature. 45 
12 Preliminary agreements: limitations to reliance interest. However, if the preliminary agree-
ment stipulated a duty to negotiate in good faith or according to fair dealing, it may be appro-
priate to limit the scope of liability to the reliance interest,46 insofar as the parties' agreement 
only reiterates an existing legal duty. In this respect, the European provisions on culpa in contra-
hendo can be seen as a guideline for the interpretation of preliminary agreements. Moreover, if 
the parties declared that their pre-contractual arrangements were not binding, eg by referring to 
them as 'gentlemen's agreements', 47 the general provision of culpa in contrahendo can still be 
applied, if the requirements of good faith and fair dealing have been infringed by one negotiat-
ing party. In this case, the liability will directly stem from European law and not from the par-
des' contract. 
13 The good faith criterion. It has been pointed out that good faith in the European law texts has 
the quality of a 'meta-language' (meta-language), which allows communication between differ-
ent legal systems48 on the prevention of abuses of freedom of contract. In fact, it has been 
stressed that on a functional level, most cases of culpa in contrahendo can also be sanctioned 
und er the common law. 49 The criterion of good faith has its origin in the civil law, since it 
derives historically from the Roman notion of bona jides. 50 As already mentioned, despite the 
traditional scepticism of the common law51 the standard of good faith and fair dealing has 
become a global and especially a European trend, even in common law jurisdictions (above, 
[3]). 52 All textuallayers ofEuropean private law (since the PECL) unanimously acknowledge a 
general duty of parties to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. 53 The PCC have 
made some minor amendments to the text of PECL54 which already stress the importance of 
this standard at the stage of the pre-contractual negotiations. 55 
45 For France (which treats culpa in contrahendo as an example of tortious liability) see Schmidt-Szalewski (fn 39) 
555-66; J Ghestin, 'La responsabilite contractuelle pour rupture des pourparlers', in J-S Borghetti, 0 Deshayes, and 
C Peres (eds), Etudes offertes a Genevieve Viney (2008) 455-65. 
46 Farnsworth, 'Precontractual Liability', 264. 
47 Farnsworth, 'Precontractual Liability', 257. 
48 See H Muir-Watt, 'Les pourparlers: de la confiance trompee a la relation de confiance', in P Remy-Corlay and 
D Fenouillet, Les concepts contractuels franfais a /'heure des Principes du droit europeen des contrats, (2003) 53-64, 54 f: 
'On peut dire que le concept de bonne foi constitue a cet egard un ,meta-langage' (selon le terme de Nicholas Kasirer) 
qui permet une communication relativerneut ajustee des differents systemes, au-dela de leurs divergences techniques.' 
In the same vein Vogenauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [4); MJ Storme, 'Good faith and contents of contracts in European 
private law', in S Espiau Espiau and A Vaquer Aloy (eds), Bases de un derecho contractual europeo: Bases of European 
Contract law (2003) 30: 'vague norms to organise sustainable diversity'. 
49 See Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good faith, 690-7; seealso Farnsworth (fn 23) 660-8.; Vogenauer/Vogenauer, 
Art 1.7, [7], who stresses the subsisting differences on the conceptual and structurallevel. 
50 MJ Schermaier, 'Bona fides in Roman contract law', in Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good faith, 63-92, espe-
cially 67 f. 
51 The good faith criterion is not completely foreign to English law. On contracts of uberrima fides see Peel, Treitel, 
[3-161]; N Schneider, Uberrima fides: Treu und Glauben und vorvertragliche Aufklärungspflichten im englischen Recht 
(2004) 111-237; L Loacker, Informed Insurance Choice? Ihe Insurer's Pre-contractual Information Duties in General 
Consumer Insurance (2015) 149-80. 
52 Vogenauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [1]. 
53 This trend in European private law has had its repercussion for national law. See eg Art 1104 Code civil: 'Les 
contrats doivent etre negocies, formes et executes de bonne foi' and Art 1112 Code civil. 
54 See PECL 1:201. 
55 See PCC 0:301: General duty of good faith and fair dealing. 'Each party is bound to act in conformity with the 
requirements of good faith and fair dealing, from the negotiation of the contract until all of its provisions have been 
given effect. The parties may neither exclude this dury, nor limit it.' The addition of PCC 0:302: Performance in good 
faith, seems to be redundant. 
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Good faith in comparison to other criteria. Due to the evolutionary power of good faith, the 14 
predse content of the criterion must be defined according to the circumstances of every single 
case. With regard to pre-contractualliability, there are some general considerations tobe taken 
into account in order to elucidate the concept. The first argument is systematic. Since PCC 2:101 
and all the other textuallayers stress the principle of contractual freedom, good faith is to be 
interpreted as a corrective principle56 which indicates that freedom of contract is not unlimited. 
This function corresponds to the general understanding of good faith as 'the need to take into 
account the legitimate interests of the other party'. 57 This respect for the other party not only 
has a moral quality, but provides an objective standard of conduct. On this view, the good faith 
criterion is close to the reasonableness enshrined in PECL 1:302.58 It applies the standard of a 
third person 'in the shoes of the parties' in order to judge whether the conduct is reasonable or 
not. An even stricter Standard is the criterion of inconsistent behaviour in PICC 1.8.59 1his can 
be identified with a prohibition of self-contradictory conduct (venire contra foctum proprium). 60 
If a party has led the other to believe something, this mistaken belief will be protected, and the 
inconsistent behaviour may not result in a benefit for the inconsistent party. The standard of 
good faith covers both situations and goes even beyond. 
A functional approach to good faith. The broadness of the notion of good faith as criterion for 15 
pre-contractualliability may also be seen as problematic, since it may invite the courts to refer 
to national preconceptions when applying the European texts. The risk of replacing the neces-
sary European standard with anational reference,61 can, however, be minimized by a functional 
approach to good faith, at least with regard to pre-contractual negotiations. If good faith 
imports standards for reasonable and consistent conduct, and, at the same time, protects mis-
taken beliefs, it is possible to shape the general expectations of the pardes at the pre-contractual 
stage. On the one hand, negotiating parties are presumed to be honest when they negotiate, and 
to disclose any relevant information to the other party. This is why, in all European texts on 
culpa in contrahendo, non-disclosure of an intent not to conclude the contract is a spedal type 
liability (PCC 2:101 (2)). On the other hand, the pardes are asked to consider and to respect 
the other party's legitimate interests and to behave consistently. This is why all European texts 
sanction the breaking off of negotiations in bad faith as the second expressly stated category of 
culpa in contrahendo (PCC 2:101 (3)). 
~. Particular applications of the principle 
AO:sen4:::e of the intention to conclude a contract (PCC 2:101 (2)). The first category ofliabil- 16 
is the original or subsequent absence of the intention to conclude a contract, where the party 
negotiating and does not disclose his inner reservation. The PICC 2.1.15 (2) as well as the 
2:301 (2) and the PCC 2:101 (2) stressthat 'a party who enters or pursues pre-contractual 
;guua1:10t1s without the intention of concluding a contract does not respect the requirements 
negotiate in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.' In fact, by negotiating without the 
tion to be bound by a contract, the party deceives the other and abuses his contractual 
On synonyms for principle see A Tenenbaum, 'Terminology', in Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud, European 
Law, 190-4, 157. 
Storme (fn 48) 19. 
PECL 1:302, Comment B. 
See the general survey by Vogenauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [10]. 
Storme (fn 48) 28 f. 
Similarly on the international standard in the PICC see Vogenauer/Vogenauer, Art 1.7, [16]. 
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freedom. 62 This extreme example of 'sham negotiations'63 is acknowledged as a ground for 
liability both in civillaw and in common law jurisdictions. 64 Typical applications of this prin-
ciple are situations where a party engages in negotiations for the sole purpose of achieving 
another objective, 'such as preventing the other party from contracting with a competitor of the 
first party, or with the sole purpose of raising the price in a parallel negotiation with a third 
party, or for the sole purpose of obtaining knowledge of business secrets of the other party.'65 
17 Matters of proof. While the ground of the aforementioned liability for 'sham negotiations' 
(above, [16]) is undisputed, some scholars have raised the difficulties of proving the party's Iack 
of intention to condude a contract during the negotiation process.66 Even if it is true that dis-
tinguishing between a pure coincidence and blameworthy conduct might be complex, the 
proof of inner facts or hidden motives is also common in other respects, eg PECL 4:103, mis-
take as to facts or law. A standard of proof for the lack of intention can be derived from 
PECL 2:102. This provision states that 'the intention of a party to be legally bound by contract 
is to be determined from the parry's Statements or conduct as they were reasonably understood 
by the other party.' As a first step, then, the courtwill have to determine whether the party's 
conduct had to be interpreted as showing an intention to be legally bound by a future contract. 
As a second step, the courtwill have to consider whether conduct vis-a-vis third persans and 
dedarations not known to the other party must be interpreted as showing that the partywas 
only pretending tobe interested in binding himselfby a contract. The distinction between these 
two stages also allows the court to deal with a 'change of intention', which-as national experi-
ence, especially in common law countries, suggests-might be even more difficult to prove.67 
18 Absence of a legitimate reason (PCC 2:101 (3)). Most commonly, the question of whether 
pre-contractual liabiliry arises when a party who has so far negotiated with the intention to 
condude a contract breaks off pre-contractual negotiations. This situation is also the most deli-
cate, since the equilibrium between the parry's negative freedom of contract and the protection 
of the other party's good faith (above, [13]-[15]) is difficult to establish. As already mentioned 
(above, [2]), the answer of the PCC 2:101 (3) to this dilemmalies in a further qualification of 
the parties' conduct. 68 The aggrieved party can only ask compensation for the losses encoun-
tered if the party 'could legitimately believe, that a contract would be concluded'; furthermore, 
the defendant will only be held liable if there was no 'legitimate reason to break off the pre-
contractual negotiations'. Both conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously. 69 In contrast to 
some nationallaws, European culpa in contrahendo does not apply if the defendant has already 
made an offer to the claimant and if, exceptionally, this offer cannot be revoked. 7° For this case, 
62 See also (for Denmark) 0 Lando, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 23 f: 'cheat 
comracting'. 
63 See Vogenauer!Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [26]. 
64 For England see J Cartwright, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 25: 'lt is essential 
for B's case that he prove that A made a false Statement during the precomractual negotiations about his intentions to 
conclude the contract'; on the difficulties of this condition see Peel, Treitel, [9-010]. 
65 Vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [26]. See the cases given as illustrations, see PECL 2:301 (4), Commentary C, 
Illustration 1 and PECL 2:301 (4), Commentary D, Illustration 2. 
66 Fages (fn 19) 314; Hager (fn 22) 72 f; Muir-Watt (fn 48) 58. 
67 Traill v Baring [1864] 4 De G J & S, 318 (46 ER 941); Wales v Wadharn [1977] 1 WLR 199, on both see Peel, 
Treitel, [9-133]. 
68 PCC 2:101 (I) para. 2 underlines that the 'failure of pre-comractual negotiations can only give rise to liability if 
it is the consequence of a fault or actions contrary to good faith and fair dealing of eieher party.' 
69 For an overview EH Hondius, 'General report', in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 1-28, 19 f; on these cases in 
German law, see W Küpper, Das Scheitern von Vertragsverhandlungen als Fallgruppe der culpa in contrahendo (1988) 48-59. 
70 This solution is explicitly maintained in French law, see Art 1116 (2) and (3) Code civil. 
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pECL 2:202 contains a special provision that leads to the conclusion of the contract: even if the 
offer itself did not indicate that it was irrevocable, the contract will be conduded if 'it was rea-
sonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reli-
ance on the offer' (PECL 2:202 (3)(c)). 
1he legitimate belief (reliance) of the claimant. In order to determine if the belief of the 19 
daimant was legitimate, it might be useful to go back to national case law, where the problern 
has been amply discussed. 71 One criterion that can sometimes be found in nationallaw is the 
duration of the negotiations. 72 In European law, due to the Standard of good faith in the field 
of pre-contractualliability, this criterion can only be applied in the sense that objectively, from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable third party, the 'point of no return'73 in the negotiation process 
has been reached. Any subjective 'belief of the claimant that cannot be founded on actual 
evidence is irrelevant, and expenses that the daimant incurred without any foundation are not 
to be compensated. 74 The reliance of the aggrieved party must be objectively comprehensible 
from the facts of the case?5 Facts that might help to justify the reliance are, primarily, the other 
party's (the defendant's) conduct or Statements. For this, an analogy with PECL 6:101 (1) may 
be helpful. 76 
1he defendant's legitimate reason for breaking off negotiations. If the daimant had a 20 
Iegitimare reason to rely on the condusion of the contract, it is up to the defendant to prove that 
he did not break off without legitimate reason, but that this was justified by special circum-
stances. Since the principle ofbreaking offwithout a legitimate motivein PCC 2:101 (3) directly 
derives from French law, the French doctrine and jurisprudence can be used to elucidate European 
tu/pa in contrahendo in this respect. It can be observed that the parties' actions are connected: 
therefore, legitimate reliance on the claimant's side and legitimate motive for breaking off on the 
defendant's side cannot be clearly separated. Once it has been shown that the claimant had a 
Iegitimare reason to rely on the formation of the contract, the defendant will need exceptional 
circumstances to prove that breaking off negotiations was nevertheless legitimate. 
Weighing parties' motives and interests. lhe weighing of the parties' motives and interests 21 
rorresponds to the French understanding of culpa in contrahendo as an application of the theory 
bf abuse of rights. 77 As has been shown, this understanding of pre-contractualliability is also 
•·•romr,attble and consistent with European law (above, [9]). According to the French Cour de 
·cmiSatJron, freedom of contract is abused if the party who has made the other believe in the for-
.'"'"' ................... of the contract breaks off without any legitimate motive (motif legitime)78 or with 
Muir-Watt (fn 48) 58; Peel, Treitel, [9-133]. 
Plas v Va/burg, HR, (1983) N] 723 (18.06.1982); Cass com, 95-20361 (07.04.1998), on which see Ghestin, 
and Serinet (fn 30) 543, [752]. 
Muir-Watt (fn 48) 55; this is also the criterion developed for the PICC, see vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [32]. 
See W Posch, ~ustria', in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 43-52, 48 f. 
Examples from different civil law countries; eg for Austria W Posch, 'Case 4', in Cartwright and Hesselink, 
reco:ntr~r.ctu.at Liability, 117 f; for Sweden C Ramberg and J Herre, 'Case 1', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractu.al 
54-6; for Swizerland P Loser, 'Case I', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 56-60. 
The official comment does not deal with this possibility. But if broken promises-as Comment C shows-can 
to remedies for non-performance, one can argue that 'broken promises' during the pre-contractual negotiations 
the other conditions of culpa in contrahendo are fulfilled-lead to pre-contractualliability. 
On the relationship between good faith and the notion of abuse see Tenenbaum (fn 56) 190-4. 
Three decisions from the 1970s are said to be fundamental for the modern development of culpa in contrahendo 
French law: Cass com, 70-14154, Bull civ IV 1972, No 93 (20.03.1972) (for an English translation of the decision 
Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.15 (FR)]); Cass civ, 71-12993, Bull civ 
No 491 (03.10.1972) (for an English version see id, Contract Law, [9.16 (FR)]); Cass civ, 74-11770, Bull civ I 
No 122 (12.04.1976). Forabrief overview see de Coninck, 'Le droit commun', 22 f. 
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'blameworthy thoughtlessness' (legerete blamable).l9 These criteria will have normally been ful-
filled if the other party's reliance was legitimate and no new element can be found in favour of 
the defendant. The (persuasive) value of an absence oflegitimate reason on the defendant's side 
is more important in the more special cases where the claimant believed he was 'the one and 
only' candidate for the contract. Although this belief is generally not protected, the French 
courts have held that the claimant's belief was legitimate in cases where the defendant was espe-
cially reckless, namely: 1) where the other party broke off crudely, that is to say without any 
prior information or just before the final signature of the fixed terms of the agreement; 80 or 
2) where the other party broke off regardless of the consequences for the other party and despite 
declarations to the contrary. 81 Since both situations are evident contraventions of good faith 
and fair dealing, it seems tobe appropriate to use similar criteria in the European law of culpa 
in contrahendo. 
3. The legal consequences: reliance interest 
22 The unsolved question of the nature of the liability in European law. The European concept 
of culpa in contrahendo, based on good faith and fair dealing, endeavours to harmonize the more 
complex national realities (above, [5]). Besides the divide between the common law and civil 
law, the civil law countries that accept pre-contractual liability have diverging ideas about its 
nature. The German-speaking tradition tends to apply contractualliability, 82 while the Romance 
countries classif)r the same liability as tortious. 83 The European restatements cite different legal 
traditions, leaving the question open. 84 The simple reference to good faith does not allow a 
decision in one or other direction. Nor can the fact that the 'PECL are principles of contract 
law be interpreted in favour of contractual liability. Since the nature of the liability was so 
diverse in European countries when the restatements of the PECL, the DCFR, and the PCC 
were drafted, it seems to be most appropriate to avoid the afore-mentioned dualism and to 
define European pre-contractual liability as a 'third way', ie a liability that is neither purely 
contractual nor purely tortious. 85 
23 Pre-contractual liability as 'third way' in between tortious and contractual liability. The 
understanding of culpa in contrahendo in European private law as a 'third way' besides tortious 
and contractualliability would avoid the vexed question of what legal rules to apply to pre-
contractualliability. The question is vexed, since the principle on culpa in contrahendo is con-
tained in restatements on contract law but does not follow the rules of contractualliability. 86 
79 Cass com, 91-18842, Bull civ IV 1994, No 79 (22.02.1994). 
80 All case law in M Poumardere, 'Responsabilite contractuelle et inexecution contractuelle', in P Le Tourneau 
(ed), Droit de La Respomabilite et des Contrats: regimes d'indemnisation (9th edn, 2012) 397, [841]. 
81 Poumardere, (fn 80) 397, [841]. Important in this regard is the Manoukian-case, Cass com, 00-10243; 
00-10949, Bull civ IV 2003, No 186 (26.11.2003), for an English translation see Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, 
Tallon, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.9 (FR)]. 
82 For a brief overview see W Posch, 'Does it Matter Whether Culpa in Contrahendo is located in Tort!Delict or 
Contract?', in K Boele-Woelki and W Grosheide (eds), The Future of European Contract Law, Essays in honour of 
E Hondius (2007) 307-20. 
83 CA Paris, Gaz Pal1883, II, 414 (13.02.1883); see J Schmidt, 'La sanction de la faute precontractuelle', (1974) 72 
Revue trimestrielle de droit civi/46-73, 51. On the recent discussion on this basis see Ghestin, Loiseau, and Serinet 
(fn 30) 530-4, [731]-[738]. 
84 PECL 2:301 (1), Notes 1. 
85 See Posch (fn 82) 307-20. 
86 This problern is weH known from the PICC, see Vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [7], who states 
'Art 2.1.15 sits uneasily within the PICC'. 
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for a 'third way' would also take into account recent developments wirhin the national 
of some member states that tend nowadays to enact statutory provisions for culpa in con-
(above, Intro before Art 2:301, [13]). With a view to these special provisions it can be 
that the question of its contractual or tortious nature has become less relevant. 87 In 
the new statutory basis implies that the rules of contractual or tortious liability tradition-
applied to culpa in contrahendo (above, Intro before Art 2:301, [10] and [11]) are now only 
for accessory questions, such as prescription and liability of third parties. Also for the 
private law, there is no need to define the nature of the pre-contractualliability, since 
applicable are clear irrespective of their contractual or tortious character. 88 It does not 
any problern to apply, eg the general three-year prescription period of PECL 14:201 to 
in contrahendo, since PECL 14:203 (1) provides that the 'general period of prescription ... 
in the case of a right to damages, from the time of the act which gives rise to the claim'. 
case of pre-contractualliability, the period will start to run from the time the defendant 
off negotiations in bad faith. 89 If third pardes are involved in the negotiating process, the 
ofPECL 1:305 (b) applies. 90 It states that 'if any person who with a party's assent was 
in making a contract ... (b) acted intentionally or with gross negligence or not in 
with good faith and fair dealing, this knowledge, foresight or behavior is imputed 
party i tself'. 
PECL 2:301 (3) speaks of the 'loss that the party by breaking offfrom negotiations 24 
to the other party'. PCC 2:101 does not contain any further specification, but accepts 
presented by the PECL, ie the compensation of the reliance interest (above, Intro 
Art 2:301, [7]). The Commentary to the PECL explains that the Iosses covered 'include 
incurred, work clone and loss on transactions made in reliance of the expected 
'
91 This explanation picks up the elements that are widely accepted in the civil law 
the heading of the negative interest92 and in the common law under the heading of the 
interest.93 1he first restatement to grant this interest for culpa in contrahendo in trans-
law was the PICC. The negative interest also covers the loss of profits, meaning the 
of another contract that the claimant could have demonstrably concluded with a third 
if he had not relied on the negotiations already begun.94 Exceptionally, the positive 
will also be compensated, if the parties are bound by preliminary agreements that 
a duty to negotiate in good faith and fair dealing. The liability incurred for infringe-
this agreement will be of a contractual nature (above, [11]), and may therefore also 
positive or the expectation interest. 95 
interest not covered. Liability for culpa in contrahendo is restricted to the reliance 25 
and does not cover the interest the party had in the performance of the contract, ie the 
respect Posch (fn 82) 311 evokes the qualification as 'legal relation' (Hondius) or the 'relational theory of 
(Macneil). 
14:201; the general period of prescription is three years. 
s also the view of PECL 14:203, Comment B. 
1:305, Comment D explicitly cites the provision on culpa in contrahendo PECL 2:301 (2). 
2:301, Comment G. 
'Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfeetion gelangten 
4 Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts 1-112, 20; Hondius, 
Liabi!ity, 22 f. 
ue~:nmemal reliance in contract andin tort see Giliker, Pre-contractua! Liabi!ity, 105-33. 
"'-'UJ:uncK. 'Le droit commun', 35 f; for Swiss law see BGE 77 II 135, 137 (06.06.1951); 80 II 26, 37 f 
same vein for the PICC see Vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.15, [43]. 
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positive or expectation interest (above, Intro before Art 2:301, [7]). This scope of pre-contrac-
tualliability is widely accepted in comparative law, and recalled in the commentary on PECL 
2:103.96 In nationallaw, some hesitation over the principle can nevertheless be observed. The 
French Cour de cassation has only recently abandoned the longstanding practice of compensat-
ing the aggrieved party in culpa in contrahendo for loss of an opportunity (perte d'une chance).97 
Sometimes, German courts have granted the positive interest,98 where one party refuses to 
sign the draft contract, and where the parties have fully agreed on the contract, only needing 
to fulfil the legal formalities. 99 Also, the Dutch case Plas v Valburg (above, Intro before 
Art 2:301, [8]) is often interpreted as meaning that the Hoge Raad permitted the compensa-
tion of the positive interest under certain circumstances. 100 However, all these cases deal with 
situations where a contract would have been concluded if the retreating party had not violated 
his pre-contractual duties. 101 Therefore no general principle can be derived from this (national) 
case law. 
26 No exceptions in European private law. For European private law, it must be bornein mind 
that the compensation of the positive interest via culpa in contrahendo would amount to a de 
focto enforcement of a contract the parties did not conclude, and would therefore violate the 
other party's negative contractual freedom. It seems at first sight that some minor loosening of 
the principle may be possible under the PICC, since the official commentary states that 'the 
aggrieved party may generally not recover the profit which would have resulted had the original 
contract been concluded (so-called expectation or positive interest)'. 102 With this, the 
Commentary on the PICC refers to the exceptional case of preliminary agreements that lead to 
contractualliability and a claim of the positive interest (above, [10]). However, some scholars 
have interpreted the word 'generally' in the sense that some of the exceptional admissions of the 
positive interest were to be integrated into European private law. 103 It must also be admitted 
that the Commentary on the PECL gives reasons for doubt, since it states that 'in some cases 
loss of opportunities may also be compensated'. 104 Since the Commentary to the PECL Stresses, 
at the same time, that no positive interest is to be granted, this addition can only be interpreted 
96 PECL 2:301, Comment G: 'However, the aggrieved party cannot claim to be put into the position in which it 
would have been if the contract had been duly performed'. 
97 Cass com, 00-10243; 00-10949, Bull civ IV 2003, No 186 (26.11.2003) (Manoukian): 'Mais attendu que Ies 
circonstances constitutives d'une faute commise dans l'exercice du droit de rupture unilaterale des pourparlers precon~ 
tractuels ne sont pas la cause du prejudice consistant dans la perte d'une chance de realiser les gains que permettait 
d'esperer la conclusion du contrat'; confirmed by Cass civ, 04-20040, Bull civ III 2006, No 164 (28.06.2006). On 
this argument see 0 Deshayes, 'Le dommage precontractuel', (2004) Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial et econom-: 
ique, 187-204, 192 f; see also Art 1111 (3) Code civil: 'Les dommages et interets ne peuvent avoir pour objet de com-
penser la perte des benefices attendus du contrat non conclu.' 
98 See BGHZ 48, 396 (27.10.1967); BGH, (1997) ]Z 467 (29.03.1996). 
99 On these cases see Küpper (fn 69) 268; critically W Lorenz, 'Germany', in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 
159-77, 167. For an example under the common law see (for England) J Cartwright, 'Case 6', in Cartwright and 
Hesselink (eds), Pre-contractual liability, 280. Another example would be the abuse of economic po'W'U' 
('Kontrahierungszwang' or coerced contracts) see BGH, (1993) N]W 520 ( Oolitic Stones, 25.11.1991), in 
Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.22 (DE)]. 
100 Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 17 interpreting lucrum cessans as expectation interest. Good argtlme:m 
against this interpretation are found in JM van Dunne, 'Netherlands', in Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 
230 f; C Bollen, 'Enforcement of the duty to carry on negotiations: (Should it be) a possibility in Europe or not?' 
J Smits, D Haas, and G Hesen (eds), Specific Performance in Contract Law: Nationaland Other Perspectives 
231-51, 233 f. 
101 Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.22 (DE)] Commentary. 
102 Commentary 2 to Art 2.1.15, p 60. 
103 On this difference see Bollen (fn 100) 238. 
104 PECL 2:301, Comment G. 
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with reference to a problern known from the Italian case, 'The Giuliana', in 1993. 105 In this case, 
the aggrieved party had wanted to conclude a contract with a third party, but of a different type 
to the one for which the negotiations were broken off in bad faith. The Corte di cassazione held 
that this loss was also to be compensated, although the nature of the lost opportunity was not 
identical to the contract that the parties were negotiating. This principle also seems to apply to 
European private law, since it would be inconsistent to restriet the party's reliance with regard 
to the nature of the lost contract. 
No place for specific performance. Exceptionally, the question has been raised if there can be 27 
a claim to continue negotiations, ie a claim of specific performance. 106 While some national 
law, eg Dutch law, holds that it is in principle possible to oblige parties to continue negotiations, 
the prevailing view in nationallaw isthat pre-contractualliability for breaking off negotiations 
is limited to the compensation of damage. 107 1his view must a fortiori also be valid for European 
private law, since the wording of 'losses' and 'liability' clearly shows that the drafter of any text 
did not think of specific performance, but of pecuniary compensation. 
Cassazione civ, 2973, Foro itl 1994, 956 (12.03.1993); seealso Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion and 
Contract Law, [9.20 (IT)]. See also A Gambaro and U Morelli, Lezioni di diritto civile (2012) 11 f. 
Hondius, Precontractual Liability, 23; Van Dunne (fn 100) 231 f; Bollen (fn 100) 239-48. 
Fora detailed discussion see Küpper (fn 69) 262-73; for a restriction on pecuniary compensation D Kaiser, 
aus culpa in contrahendo bei Abbruch von Verhandlungen über formbedingte Verträge', (1997) ]Z 
453. For French law see Bollen (fn 100) 244. 
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Art 2:302: Breach of Confidentiality 
If confidential information is given by one party in the course of negotiations, the other party is under 
a duty not to disdose that information or use it for its own purposes whether or not a contract is sub-
sequently conduded. The remedy for breach of this duty may indude compensation for loss suffered 
and restitution of the benefit received by the other party. 
PICC2.1.16: Dutyof 
confidentiality 
Where information is 
given as confidemial by 
one party in the course of 
negotiations, the other 
party is under a duty not 
to disdose that informa-
tion or to use it improp-
erly for its own purposes, 
whether or not a contract 
is subsequently con-
duded. Where appropri-
ate, the remedy for breach 
ofthat duty may include 
compensation based on 
rhe benefit received by 
the other party. 
PCC 2:103: Dutyof 
Confidentiality 
If confidential informa-
tion is given by one 
party in the course of 
negotiations, rhe other 
party is under a duty not 
to disdose rhat informa-
tion or use it for its own 
purposes whether or 
not a contract is subse-
quently concluded. The 
remedy for breach of 
this duty may include 
compensation for Iosses 
suffered and restitution 
of the benefit received 
by the other party. 
I. Introducdon 
II. Comparative overview 
III. Requirements and remedies 
1. Confidential information 
2. Breach of confidentiality 
3. Remedies 
DCFR 11.-3:302: Breach of confidentiality 
(I) If confidential information is given by one party 
in the course of negotiations, the other party is under 
a duty not to disclose rhat information or use it for 
that party's own purposes whether or not a contract is 
subsequently concluded. 
(2) In this Article, "confidential information" means 
information which, eirher from its nature or rhe cir-
cumstances in which it was obtained, the party receiv-
ing the information knows or could reasonably be 
expected to know is confidential to the other party. 
(3) A party who reasonably anticipates a breach of the 
duty may obtain a court order prohibiting it. 
( 4) A party who is in breach of the duty is liable for 
any loss caused by the breach and may be ordered to 
pay over to the other party any benefit obtained by 
the breach. 
I. lntroduction 
FS 28: Breach of 
confidentiality 
(I) If confidential 
negotiations, th 
party is under a 
to disclose that 
party's own 
ordered to pay 
other party any 
obtained by the 
[1]-[5] 
[6]-[7] 
[8]-[20] 
[9]-[10] 
[11]-[15] 
[16]-[20] 
1 Confidentiality in commercial contracts. Liability for breach of confidentiality has long been 
an element of the Common law (below, [7]) and has been acknowledged as a principle of trans-
national law with the publication of the first version of the PICC in 19941 (see below, [8]). 
Although issues of confidentiality were always dosely related to the specific contexts of com-
mercial contracts and arbitration, confidentiality has later become an element of the European 
1 PICC1994 2.16 was identical to the current PICC 2.l.I6. 
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model rules, especially the PECL (with the amendments of part I in 2000)2 and the DCFR. 3 
Indeed, the national case laws on breach of confidentiality provide evidence that the problern is 
not confined to commercial circumstances. 4 It should be noted, however, that the concept of 
breach of confidentiality in transnationallaw is nanower than in many nationallaws, being con-
fined to the disclosure and misuse of confidential information obtained during pre-contractual 
negotiations. This may explain, besides the exclusion of culpa in contrahendo from the scope of 
the instrument (above, Art 2: 301), why the CESL did not provide for any rule on confidential-
ity, even if such a rule might have been relevant in the b2b contracts envisaged by the instrument. 
Another reason for its exdusion from the CESL, has been the recent publication of a Directive 
'on the protection of undisdosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure' by the European Union. 5 This Directive, for which 
a proposal had been published in November 2013, harmonizes the law of the member states as 
from June 2018. Information obtained in the course of negotiations is an important aspect, 
though not the central focus of the Directive (see Art 3 (3)), which more generally seeks to pro-
teer the holders of trade secrets against all forms of unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure. 
Duty or obligation? All provisions under review are nearly identical in their formulation, one 2 
exception being the legal characterization of the parties' commitment to confidentiality: 
whereas the PICC, PECL, PCC, the DCFR, and the FS speak of a 'duty' to respect confidenti-
ality, the Avant projet uses the expression 'obligation' of confidentiality ( the CESL does not 
provide for any provision on the issue). 6 In the European model rules, the term 'duty' typically 
refers to the framework of the contract and to the 'behavioural charter' applicable to the con-
tracting parties, whereas 'obligation' seems more appropriate to describe the 'promised 
performance of a material or intellectual obligation'. 7 In view of this terminology, the wording 
of the majority of texts seems to accurately portray the legal nature; yet the relevance of this 
difference should not be overemphasized as a duty of confidentiality may become an obligation, 
if the parties agree on the confidential nature of information and determine sanctions to apply 
in cases of breach (below, [9]). 
Definition of confidentiality. Generally speaking, confidentiality refers to information that is 3 
not meant to be in the public domain and is therefore not to be disdosed to third parties with-
out the consent of the holder. 8 The term 'confidentiality' is close to the concept of confidence 
and privacy, but must not be confounded with these terms. First and foremost, confidence and 
2 Art 2:302 was not contained in the fi.rst part of the PECL published in 1995; it was only induded in the revised 
version of part I published rogether with part II in 2000. 
3 On the relation between confidentiality on the one hand and commercial habits and arbitration on the other see 
Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International CommercialArbitration, 1-5. 
4 On examples of breach of confidence in the nationallegal systems, see Gurry, Breach of Conjidence, especially 
(categories of confidential information). 
5 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of 
undisdosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disdosure. 
6 Gandolfi, Avant-projet, Art 8: Obligation of confidentiality: '(I) The parties have the obligation to treat with 
.·.··aiCllnlspe:cticm any confidential information obtained during negotiations. 
(2) Whichever party does not comply with this obligation shall compensate the other for any resulting loss, 
and if he has also drawn undue benefi.t from the confidential information he must recompense the other party to 
the extent of his own enrichment.' 
7 A Tenenbaum, 'Terminology', in Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud, European Contract Law, 40 f. 
8 Gurry, Breach ofConfidence, 4 f; Smeureanu, Conjidentiality in International CommercialArbitration, 5 f. 
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privacy are more general insofar as they cover a variety of situations that are characterized by a 
personal element, such as health, identity, or family. Confidentiality in these contexts is only a 
consequence of the personal character of information linked to intimate, familial, or personal 
affairs that are by their very nature not meant to be known to the public. With regard to the 
state, the protection of confidence and privacy is to be regarded as a human (or civil) right; 
hence, meaning public authorities must respect the privacy of private life. 9 In contrast, the 
notion of confidentiality in European private law is linked to negotiations between private par-
des. This implies that it also comprises information concerning legal persans and commercial 
or business secrets, 10 and that it is left to the parties to define which information is tobe treated 
as confidential (below, [9]). 
4 Instances of potentially confidential information. Due to the parties' power to define infor-
mation as confidential, confidential information may concern technical, commercial, or indus-
trial know-how, Strategie choices, clients or suppliers or results of a due diligence investigation 
of the contracting partner. 11 These examples can be summarized under the heading 'trade 
secrets'. 12 Even if 'trade secrets' are the most common type of confidential information, the 
provisions cited are not restricted to these economic aspects, but might as weil apply to personal 
data or other secrets of the parties involved in the negotiations. 
5 Policy considerations. At first sight, the protection given to confidential information seems to 
hinder or restriet competition. 13 However, the economic analysis of unfair competition has shown 
that such restrictions are necessary to some extent to incentivize innovation, thereby effectively 
strengthening competition. 14 The protection of confidential information in the context of con-
tractual relationships may complement the protection extended by intellectual property rights 
such as a patents or copyrights, especially before such absolute protection becomes effective. Thus, 
the protection of confidential information given in the course of contractual negotiations may be 
particularly important during the application process for intellectual property rights. 15 
II. Comparative overview 
6 Civillaw countries. Most civillaw jurisdictions do not provide for special remedies where a 
party has suffered a breach of confidentiality. 16 In some countries, however, eg in Italy, special 
laws protect trade and industrial secrets; 17 in others, such as France, the protection of confiden-
tial information provided during negotiations has become a specific aspect of the law against 
9 Gurry, Breach of Conjidence, 12 f ('personal confidences'). 
10 On these differences seealso von Bar, Non-contractual Liability, 2:205, Comment, [2]. 
11 Foralistsee Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.31]. For rypical con-
tent see Kurz, Vertraulichkeitsvereinbarungen, 27 f. 
12 Gurry, Breach ofConjidence, 7 f. 
13 Gurry, Breach ofConjidence, 9 f. 
14 On the economic analysis of competition see JE Stieglitz, 'The Meanings of Competition in &onomic Analysis'. 
(1992) 100 Rivista Internazianale di Scienze Sociali 191-212. 
15 See the French leading case Cass com, 77-10915, Bull civ 1978, No 208 (03.10.1978) 176, where the daimant 
had initiated a patent procedure; the Austrian leading case OGH 4 Ob 166/93 (22.03.1994) 552, where the slogan 
taken over by the defendant had not yet obtained protection by copyright. 
16 This may change after the implementation of the Trade Secrets Directive (above, fn 5) which is meant to har-
monize the proteeden of trade secrets by June 9, 2018. 
17 A Musy, 'Case 12', in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 351 f. 
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unfair competition (concurrence deloyale). 18 Most legal systems, however, rely on the traditional 
instruments of tortious (delictual) and pre-contractualliability (culpa in contrahendo). Mostly, 
those instruments are regarded as sufficient to cover the disdosure of confidential information 
exchanged during pre-contractual negotiations. 19 It follows that the discussion in civillaw on 
the nature of culpa in contrahendo as an instrument of contract law or the law of delict (above, 
before Art 2:301, [9]) is relevant also as far as the application of culpa in contrahendo to confi-
dential information is concerned. Indeed, the problern of the nature of pre-contractualliability 
has been intensively discussed in German law. According to the prevailing opinion, know-how 
and other secrets are not proteered as absolute intellectual property rights under § 823 I BGB 
unless its owner has been granted a formal intellectual property right; 20 hence liability depends 
on whether the other partywas under an implied pre-contractual duty not to disclose informa-
tion obtained during negotiations. 21 
Common law. A special remedy for the breach of confidentiality is acknowledged in the com- 7 
mon law, where parties are held to be under a duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair 
dealing as far as confidential information is concerned. 22 1he basis of this liability may be con-
tractual, especially if the pardes have explicitly agreed on the protection of confidential infor-
mation; or it may be founded on equity. 23 It is a consequence of the strong influence of common 
law on the practice of international arbitration that the idea of confidentiality as an autono-
maus basis of liability has found its way into civillaw. Moreover, the importance of know-how 
in the technological world and the digital revolution seem to stimulate the debate on confiden-
tial information in national, transnational, and internationallaw. 
111. Requirements and remedies 
Outline. As explained above, the concept of confidentiality has its origins in international 8 
commercial contracts, 24 but has found its way into European contract law. By introducing 
liability for a breach of confidentiality, the transnational instruments are said toresrate a special 
case of the general principle of good faith and fair dealing in pre-contractual negotiations. 25 It 
seems that the actual formulations of the transnational texts are a mixture of the common law 
idea ofliability in equity for breach of confidence and the civilian idea of culpa in contrahendo. 26 
18 The leading case for breach of confidentiality (in relation to pre-contractual negotiations) is still Cass com, 
77-10915, Bull civ 1978, No 208 (03.10.1978) 176. The case involved an engineer who had invented a special procedure 
for the erection of concrete constructions. A company used the procedure known from negotiations with the engineer 
without enquiring whether the technical procedure was new or original. The court held the company liable in tort for 
misuse of confidemial information. See also Cass civ, 12-25900, Bull civ I 2014, No 85 (13.05.2014). 
19 PECL 2:302, Note 1. 
20 On the discussion see Münchener Kommentar/Wagner,§ 823, [282]-[286]; cf also C Ann, 'EU-Richtlinie zum 
Schutz vertraulichen Know-hows-Wann kommt das neue deutsche Recht, wie sieht es aus, was ist noch offen', (2016) 
GRUR-Prax 465-7, 466. 
21 BGH, (1961) N]W 1308 (17.03.1961); see Münchener Kommentar/Emmerich, § 311, [62]; Münchener 
Kctmmentar/Westermann, § 453, [37] f. 
22 Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415; on the conditions see Gurry, Breach ofConjidence, 25-35. 
23 On the relation between the two foundations, cf Gurry, Breach of Confidence, 39-42; Dal Pont, Law of 
'Conjidentiality, 258-60. 
24 Its original source in national laws seems to be the common laws' tort of breach of confidence; see von Bar, 
;~vtm-c·ontract:uaL Liability, 2:205, Comment, [1]. 
WJgenauer!Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [I]. 
For the good faith argument in Common law cf Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349, 361; for the three types of duty in 
i~i..COJntraLctual relations in French law see Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.3]. 
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As a consequence of this approach, liability for the breach of confidentiality is independent of 
'whether or not a contract is subsequently concluded'. 27 Nevertheless, according to transnational 
authorities, liability should be the exception to the general principle of freedom of informa-
tion. 28 It follows that courts will assume a duty to treat information as confidential which has 
been obtained during pre-contractual negotiations only under exceptional circumstances.29 
1. Confidential information 
9 Confidentiality agreements. An approach to proteer confidential information is the condusion 
of an explicit agreement to that effect. Such 'confidentiality' or 'non-disdosure agreements' are a 
common practice in international commercial contracts30 and also in national transactions, espe-
cially in mergers and acquisitions. 31 Typically, such agreements define specific information as 
confidential and prohibit disclosure of the content thereof to third parties; moreover, they usu-
ally provide for penalties, compensation, or injunctions against the partyviolaring its duty of 
non-disdosure. If the parties have come to an agreement on such terms, liability will be contrac-
tual in nature, even if the main contract has not come into existence or has later been avoided 
due to non-performance. 32 In contractual practice, confidentiality agreements usually set time 
limits. Thus, the other partywill not be liable after a specific period of time has elapsed. Moreover, 
there can be no liability for the disdosure of information, once the information has become 
public, or has lost its secrecy as a result of events other than disdosure by the contracting party. 33 
10 Implied duties of confidentiality. Implied duties of confidentiality may arise in cases where 
the parties have not explicitly agreed on the confidentiality of information provided in the 
course of negotiations;34 yet in such cases duties of non-disdosure may only be assumed under 
specific circumstances. Decisive aspects to consider in deciding whether information is confi-
dential are: the nature of the information, the object of the contract, and all the expectations 
expressed by the parties during the negotiations. 35 Where there is doubt, it is necessary to 
balance both parties' interests.36 Four criteria set out in Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v 
27 Idendeal formulations in all three instruments; see PECL 2:302; PICC 2.1.16; PCC 2:103; DCFR II.-3:302 (1). 
28 PECL, Comment A; DCFR II.-3:302, Comment A; Vt>genauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [8]. 
29 PECL, Comment B; DCFR II.-3:302, Comment B; Vt>genauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [9]. 
3° For examples of such clauses, see Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, 9-14; a 
thorough analysis in Kurz, Vertraulichkeitsvereinbarungen, 19-61. 
31 On mergers and acquisitions see eg J Linke and M Fröhlich, 'Gestaltungsoptionen für Vertraulichkeitsvereinba-
rungen bei Unternehmenstransaktionen', (2014) Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht 449-54. 
32 This solution has been adopted by the CISG, see CISG 81 (1): 'avoidance does not affect any provision of the 
contract for the settlement of dispures or any other provision of the contract governing the rights and obligations of 
the parties consequent upon the avoidance of the contract.' It must be applied also to confidentiality clauses, cf 
M Bridge, ~t 81 CISG', in S Kröll, L Mistelis, and P Perales Viscasillas, UN-Convention on the International Safes of 
Goods ( CISG): Commentary (2011) [8]. 
33 cf Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, 165 f. 
34 The differentiation between absolute and relative confidentiality in von Bar, Non-contractual Liability, 2:205, 
Comment, [8] is not helpful in this respect, as it assumes that there is confidential information as such. The example 
given for absolute confidential information is two doctors suffering from AIDS. However, there may be situations 
where the information must be revealed despite its highly personal and hurtful nature, eg where a patients' health is at 
stake. Another connotation of these terms is in Y Derains, 'Evidence and Confidentiality', (2009) International ChambeP 
ofCommerce International Court of Arbitration bulletin, Special Supplement 57-71, 61. 
35 Examples in Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, 14-17, notably Dolling Balter 
v Merret [1990] 1 WLR 1205, where privacy of procedure is regarded as a ground for confidentiality. Illustrativeis 
a German case on ghost-writing (for the former chancellor Helmut Kohl), on which see Landgericht Köln, 114 
315114 (03.11.2014). The court found that by its very nature the contract on ghost-writing a biography included 
confidentiality agreement. 
36 Examples of this balancing of interests can be found in nationallaws, see Dal Pont, Law of Confidentiality, 269 
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,,,,"~ ... ,n-· seem tobe particularly helpful:38 information is tobeheldas confidential, if firstly, the 
of the information believed that its release would cause darnage to him or enable com-
rs to gain a financial advantage; secondly, that the information was not known to others; 
that these two beliefs were reasonable; and finally, that the three criteria mentioned must 
·udged in light of the usages and practices of the relevant industry. 39 These criteria can be 
as applications of the general principle of good faith and fair dealing in pre-contractual 
tions. A slightly different definition of confidential information is used by DCFR 
2 (2), according to which confidential information 'means information which, either 
its nature or the circumstances in which it was obtained, the party receiving the informa-
knows or could reasonably be expected to know is confidential to the other party.'40 Yet, 
be stressed that the circumstances of the transmission of information cannot determine 
·nature of the piece of information itself; it can only be argued that under special circum-
the chosen type of communication can exclude the confidential nature of informa-
l The Comments to PCC 2:101 therefore emphasize that the confidentiality of the 
tion may derive from the nature of the information, the other party's particular status, 
the object of the contract itself. 42 Whether the other party knew or ought to have 
of the confidential nature is an aspect of the breach of confidentiality (below, [14]). 
;c:.,...,.,""..,." of confidentiality 
~De11ae~nt discovery not covered. Under European private law, the rule on breach of confi- 11 
is restricted to cases where confidential information has been shared by one party in 
n of a future contract (above, [8]). This follows from the rule's foundation on the 
of good faith and fair dealing during negotiations. Indeed, the function of all provi-
under review is to protect parties' reliance on the confidentiality of their contractual 
· ns. Hence, where information has been independently obtained, or where a techno-
tool or commercial practice is the result of a parallel invention, its disclosure or use does 
under the provision. 43 Even where information has been obtained in an illegitimate 
via criminal activity or espionage, Art 2:302 does not grant protection, if this has hap-
independently of contractual negotiations.44 
Whereas the definition of confidential information depends on the interests of the 12 
, or holder, of the information, the act of infringement is primarily to be regarded from 
criteria were cited wich approval by the Irish Supreme Court in House ofSpring Gardens v Point Blank Ltd 
1, 663; R Priel, 'Case 12', in J Cartwright and M Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 349 f. 
Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227, 248. 
e same vein seevon Bar, Non-contractual Liability, 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence: 'Loss caused to 
a result of communication which, either from its nature or the circumstances in which it was obtained, the 
.u .. •u.u .. •• ~ ... ting the information knows or could reasonably be expected to know is confidential to the person 
loss is legally relevant damage.' 
urting out information in public', on which see Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, as dis-
mnaentti"al Communications: Case Note' (1969) 18/nternational & Comparative Law Quarrerly 1016-17. 
n and D Mazeaud, Principes contractuels communs (2008) 268: 'le caractere confidentiel de 
peut se deduire de la nature meme de cette information, inherente au statut particulier du contractant 
meme du contrat' (for the English, see PCC). 
e independent invention cf Gurry, Breach of Conjidence, 111 f. 
cases are, however, covered by the Trade Secrets Directive (fn 5). On the special situations of negotiations 
Breach of Confidence, 125 f. On the typical interests of parties disdosing certain information during 
negotiations, see Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson, Rutgers, Talion, and Vogenauer, Contract Law, [9.31]. 
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the infringer's perspective. All transnational instruments envisage two kinds of infringement of 
confidentiality: all instruments impose sanctions for the disclosure of confidential information 
to third parties on the one hand, and the use of the confidential information by the other party 
'for its own purposes' on the other. 45 Disdosure comprises all forms of deliberate or negligent 
communication of the information by any means;46 hence, the simple fact that the information 
disclosed was not intended to be known to third parties is sufficient for finding a breach of 
confidentiality.47 In contrast, the question whether the self-serving use of confidential informa-
tion is 'improper' and thus amounts to a breach of confidentiality depends on the nature of the 
information and the purpose for which it is used (below, [13]). 
13 Improper use of confidential information. The use of confidential information 'for own pur-
poses' is more difficult to define and largely depends on the circumstances of the individual 
case. The commentaries on the transnational instruments do not provide examples of typical 
cases of this kind of infringement.48 Therefore, the case law of national courts must be con-
sulted to determine the meaning of 'improper use' (PICC) or 'use for own purposes' (PECL, 
DCFR). The first case that comes to mind is the leading English case where the defendant 
applied forapatent in respect of a carpet grip that resembled the non-patented device that the 
claimant had created and revealed to the defendant during their negotiations. 49 Quite similarly, 
in the Austrian leading case, the defendant used a publicity slogan, developed by the claimant 
and disclosed during negotiations that had ultimately failed. 50 A comparable and recent French 
decision deals with a parental control system for the internet, invented by the claimant and 
copied-at least in part-by the defendant to whom the claimant had revealed the invention.51 
These examples illustrate that the misuse of confidential information does not substantially dif-
fer from its disdosure to third parties. In fact, in cases of misuse, the party does not disclose 
information to others but draws a direct and own advantage from the use of the entrusted 
information. This use can be called 'improper' or 'for its own purposes' insofar as it does not 
accord with the implied agreement on terms of which the information has been provided, and 
thus infringes, contrary to good faith and fair dealing, the rights and interests of the holder of 
the information. 52 Such abuse of confidential information is clearly apparent where the use of 
the confidential information benefits the infringer or where an advantage linked to the informa-
tion is lost to its 'owner'. Thus, the question whether the information is protected as a property 
right is only one argument when weighing both parties' interests. 53 Of equal value may be 
personal rights or mere business interests that can equally be harmed by the im proper use of the 
confidential information. In any event, detriment or harm on the side of the holder of the 
45 A variation in PICC 2.1.16 which speaks of'improper use', on which see Vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [17]-. 
46 See von Bar, Non-contractual Liability, 2:205, speaking of the infringernent as 'cornmunication'. 
47 See vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [16]. 
48 An explanation is rnissing for PICC, seealso Vogenauer!Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [17]. 
49 Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415, on which see Vogenauer!Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [17]. 
5o OGH 4 Ob 166/93 (22.03.1994) 552. 
51 Cass civ, 12-25900, Bull civ I 2014, No 85 (13.05.2014). 
52 In English law, this argurnent is narned 'springboard doctrine'. According to this doctrine, 'a person 
obtains inforrnation in confidence rnust not use it for activities detrirnental to the person who gave the confi 
information', see Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, as discussed in 'Confidential Cornrnunications~ 
Case Note' (fn 41) 1016. 
53 See, for the German discussion, Münchener Kommentar/Wagner, § 823, [282]-[286]; S Lorenz & W VO!<~el~tn~f 
'Case 12', in J Cartwright and M Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 346 f. Lorenz and Vogelsang rnake clear that 
other party rnay nevertheless be liable on the basis of culpa in contrahendo even if a claim on the basis of the law of 
is denied. 
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information is not necessary, since im proper use may lead to an enrichment of the other party 
without measurable harm on the holder's side (below, [18]). 54 
f{nowledge or negligence. Liability presupposes that the other party disdosing or improperly 14 
using confidential information which has been obtained during negotiations was aware of the 
confidentiality of the information or was at least negligent with regard to its confidentiality. 55 
This subjective criterion is not explicidy mentioned in the non-legislative codifications, but 
·ves from the foundation of the duty to confidentiality in good faith and fair dealing (see 
above, Art 2:301 Negotiations contrary to good faith, [13]-[21]). In fact, an infringement of the 
of confidentiality can only be contrary to good faith if the other party can be blamed for 
taking into account the other party's interests that it knew or should have known of 
~lustiJttca.tJ'lon of disclosure or use of confidential information. Under exceptional circum- 15 
~.~tance:s, the disclosure, or even the use, of confidential information can be regarded as justified 
excused, so that the party disclosing or using the information incurs no liability. The most 
examples are legal provisions prescribing disclosure for the sake of an overriding 
interest. 56 Indeed, the most frequently discussed excuse for the disclosure of confidential 
tion concerned cases where the other party prepared litigation or brought an action 
made it necessary to share confidential information with legal advisers or with the 
.57 In such cases, the claimant's interest in bringing proceedings is regularly considered to 
the other party's interest in the protection of confidentiality of the information given 
in the interest of j ustice). One can, however, imagine that the disclosure of confiden-
information in court or to a lawyer might ·nevertheless constitute a breach of confidentiality 
such disclosure is not helpful or not strictly necessary for the outcome of the case. 
,...,."'"''"""""',., in recent times, spectacular cases have raised attention to the problern of whistle-
which has now been explicitly regulated in Art 5 of the Trade Secrets Directive.58 
The non-legislative codifications provide for the compensation of Iosses and for the 16 
.......... , .... ..., ..... ofbenefits received; moreover, DCFR II.-3:302 (3) mentions the injunctions ('court 
which may indeed be necessary to prevent future breaches of the duty of confidence 
, [19]). Even if not expressly stated by the PECL andin the PICC, though in DCFR 
.302 ( 4), it is evident that all those remedies require causation:59 the Iosses of one party must 
been caused by the breach of confidentiality of the other; the benefit of the responsible party 
derive from its breach. In the same vein, prohibitory injunctions will only be granted if 
can be predicted with relative certainty; thus, causation must be plausible. 60 
This isadifferent from the common law approach according to which proof of any detriment suffered by a 
or entity is necessary, see Dal Pont, Law of Confidentiality, 264 f 
See Dal Pont, Law ofConfidentiality, 267 f (for remedy in equity). 
Examples in Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International CommercialArbitration, 114-21. 
'Disclosure in the Interest of Justice', on which see Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International Commercial 
122-5. 
See above, fn 5. On the right to disdosure in Great Britain see D Lewis, 'Ten Years ofPublic Imerest Disdosure 
· in the UK: Are Whisdeblowers Adequately Protected', (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 497-507. 
Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud (fn 42) 269: 'l'effectivite de ce droit a la reparationdemeure neanmoins sub-
a la preuve du lien de causalite entre le manquement au devoir de confidentialite et le prejudice souffert par 
parties' (for the English, see PCC). 
This condition derives from nationallaws, on which see Beatson, Burrows, and Cartwright, Anson, 615 f 
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17 Compensation ofloss. Quite clearly, the disclosure or misuse of confidential information may 
infringe the rights of the other party. Alllass that has been caused by the breach of confidential-
ity must therefore be compensated.61 Compensation comprises all harm caused to the party's 
interests and rights, eg loss of credit (and the need to pay more for a loan of money), loss of 
reputation (and the market's turning to competitors), loss of a contract with third parties (if it 
can be clearly proven that these parties were about to conclude contracts with the other party 
when the informationwas disclosed to them). 62 Punitive damages to discourage the use of trade 
secrets, although acknowledged in some jurisdictions, are not recognized under European pri-
vate law.63 
18 Restitution. Confidential information may have a commercial value. 64 If the advantage linked 
to the information is shifted from the holder of the information to the party disclosing or mis-
using it, the enriched party is held liable on the basis of unjustified enrichment; hence, it has to 
pay the value of the gain obtained by the disclosure or misuse of the information. 65 Thus, all 
texts agree that the sanctions for breach of confidentiality are not limited to the compensation 
of darnage but also include restitution of the benefit received by the other party. 66 This remedy 
is traditionally referred to as 'restitution'. 67 Although such a remedy is not acknowledged in all 
European jurisdictions, the Comments on the DCFR argue that it should be granred in analogy 
to the remedies available for an infringement of intellectual property rights. 68 Moreover, it has 
been acknowledged in jurisdictions like Germany, in which such an analogy is deemed 
im plausible. 69 
19 Injunctions. Only DCFR II.-3:302 (3) mentions the possibility of raising an action for injunc-
tion ('court order') against the disclosure or the use of confidential information. Nevertheless, 
this remedy seems to be generally acknowledged under nationallaws and in transnationallegal 
practice. 70 The procedure and the conditions depend on nationallaws as the transnational texts 
do not specify procedural rules. 
20 Free choice among different remedies. The holder of the information shall have the choice 
among the three remedies;71 moreover, an injunction may be granted in addition to a daim for 
damages or restitution. 
61 1/0genauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [18]. 
62 DFCR II.-3:302, Comment C. 
63 For Sweden see C Ramberg & J Herre, 'Case 12', in J Cartwright and M Hesselink, Precontractual Liability, 358 f. 
64 1/0genauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [19]. 
65 On enrichment see PECL 2:302, Note 2. 
66 The best example is case OGH 4 Ob 166/93 (22.03.1994) 552, that gave a 'claim for misapproprütttOJl: 
(Verwendungsampruch) which is an application of 'unjust enrichment', for the use of a slogan invented by the 
party during the negotiations ('Wienerwald II'). 
67 PECL 15:104, although a general provision on unjustified enrichment has been avoided in the PECL, 
C von Bar & S Swann (eds), Principles of European Law: Unjustijied Enrichment (PEL Unj. Enr.) (2010) [134]. 
68 DCFR II.-3:302, Comment C. 
69 For references, see above, fn 20. Nevertheless, such a remedy may be grantedunter § 285 BGB. 
7° For the remedy of injunctions missing in the PICC, see Vogenauer/Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [21]. 
71 For free choice seealso Vogenauer!Zuloaga Rios, Art 2.1.16, [22]. 
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